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The American people are suffering from what can be called "a syndrome 
of paranoia and neglect" about potential dangers to their health, safety, 
and the environment. This leads to a paradox that is becoming increas­
ingly recognized. Large amounts of resources are devoted to slight or 
speculative dangers while substantial and well-documented dangers re­
main unaddressed. 
-John Graham1 
The last third of the twentieth century is not too late a time for turning 
the rule of law and the non-delegation doctrine into effective and useful 
legal tools for minimizing injustice from improper discretionary power. 
-Kenneth Culp Davis2 
I. INTRODUCTION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
This Article deals with two linked questions. The first involves the 
future of the Clean Air Act.3 The particular concern is how the Envi­
ronmental Protection Agency ("EPA") might be .encouraged, with 
help from reviewing courts, to issue better ambient air quality stan­
dards, and in the process to shift from some of the anachronisms of 
1970s environmentalism to a more fruitful approach to environmental 
protection. The second question involves the role of the nondelega­
tion doctrine in American public law, a doctrine that shows unmistak­
able signs of revival. I will suggest that improved performance by 
EPA and agencies in general, operating in tandem with a new ap­
proach to judicial review, would make it altogether unnecessary to re­
vive the nondelegation doctrine. Indeed, the nondelegation doctrine 
would emerge as a crude and unhelpful response to existing problems 
in modem regulation, even a form of judicial usurpation. Far better 
responses are available. 
A. Basic Proposals and First Principles 
In issuing and revising a national ambient air quality regulation 
under the Clean Air Act, EPA should provide a detailed "benefits 
analysis." To this end, it should undertake two tasks. First, it should 
1. John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress, in RISKS, COSTS, 
AND LIVES SAVED: GETIING BETTER REsULTS FROM REGULATION 183, 183 (Robert w. 
Hahn ed., 1996). 
2. KENNETH CULP DA VIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 51 
(1969). 
3. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994). 
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specify the range of benefits that it believes are likely to result from 
the regulation, along with a specification of the range of benefits that 
it believes would result from at least two reasonable alternative ap­
proaches, one stricter and one more lenient. In the process EPA 
should identify the residual risk left under the competing regulatory 
regimes; it should also acknowledge scientific uncertainty, to the ex­
tent that uncertainty exists and requires guesswork. This proposal is 
an effort to strengthen the role of sound science in environmental pro­
tection. 
Second, EPA should explain why it believes that the chosen rule is 
preferable to the less and more stringent alternatives - why the set of 
benefits to be received from the selected rule justify that rule, whereas 
the set of benefits to be received from the less and more stringent 
rules do not. In the process it should explain why the residual risk left 
by the selected rule is acceptable, while the residual risk left by the 
less stringent rule is not. This proposal is an effort to strengthen the 
role of democratic forces in environmental protection.4 
If necessary, reviewing courts should require EPA to perform 
these tasks. Taken together, the two proposals should increase the 
level of consistency across regulations, reduce the power of well­
organized· private groups, and diminish the risks associated with both 
insufficient and excessive environmental regulation. If EPA has un­
dertaken the two tasks, and carried them out in a reasonable way, ju­
dicial review is at an end; courts should uphold EP A's decision. 
Ideas of this kind have potentially broad implications, extending 
well beyond the Clean Air Act and even EPA, to the work of the Oc­
cupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), the Con­
sumer Product Safety Commission, and the National Highway Traffic 
and Safety Administration as well. They would mark a key moment in 
the movement toward a system of environmental protection that is at 
once more democratic and better informed. At the same time, they 
would accelerate the continuing shift from 1970s environmentalism 
and indeed 1970s regulation in general, away from recognizing the ex­
istence of problems of safety and health and toward assessing their 
magnitude, in such a way as to reduce both regulatory paranoia and 
regulatory neglect, and to put a premium on the acquisition of infor­
mation.5 
4. Of course costs are important too; the two proposals are based on the current under­
standing that benefits, but not costs, may be taken into account in issuing primary standards. 
The question of costs is taken up later. See infra Section VI.C. 
5. For general discussion in this vein, see STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS 
CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION {1993), and NEIL GUNNINGHAM & 
PETER GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1998). 
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If agencies undertook tasks of this kind, there would be little point 
to the recent resurgence of interest in the nondelegation doctrine. 
The sensible impulses that underlie that interest - impulses that in­
volve accountability, deliberation, and sound policymaking - can be 
handled through other means, a point that casts a more general light 
on the proper role of the nondelegation doctrine in American public 
law. I suggest that the proper role of that doctrine consists in statutory 
construction that imposes floors and ceilings on agency action, and in 
a set of "nondelegation canons" that prevent agencies from acting 
without clear congressional authorization. Taken together, judicial 
requirements of this kind would constitute a form of "democracy­
promoting minimalism"6 in the distinctive context of administrative 
law - and a partial step toward a better and more sophisticated ap­
proach to environmental protection. These are the basic claims that I 
will attempt to defend in this Article. 
B. The Clean Air Act 
The Clean Air Act may well be the most important of all environ­
mental statutes. Its effects include a wide range of beneficial conse­
quences for human health and well-being and high costs on the private 
sector. The Environmental Protection Agency estimates overall com­
pliance costs at $0.5 trillion.7 The Act's claim to success rests on 
enormous improvements in ambient air quality and corresponding 
health benefits. EPA estimates that the Act prevents at least 45,000 
deaths annually and that it also prevents a minimum of 13,000 heart 
attacks and 7,000 annual strokes.8 On a standard (though not undis­
puted) view, the benefits of the Act, ranging between $5.6 trillion and 
$49.4 trillion, far exceed its costs.9 
6. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT {1999), on the general topic of judicial minimalism. 
7. See J. CLARENCE DA VIES & JAN MAzuREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED 
STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 130 {1998). 
8. See id. Judgments about benefits, nonmonetized but especially monetized, are highly 
sensitive to contentious assumptions, and hence the "bottom line" numbers should be taken 
with many grains of salt. See RANDALL LUTIER, AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF THE EPA's 
BENEFIT EsTIMATES IN OMB's DRAFT REPORT ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
REGULATION {1998) (urging the use of plausible alternative assumptions and asserting that 
EP A's benefit calculations are inflated); see also Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of 
Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE LJ. 1981 {1998) (urging that costs per lives saved are inflated, 
also because of contentious assumptions). Though coming from different directions, Lutter 
and Heinzerling both argue, convincingly, that characterization of both benefits and costs 
can shift dramatically with small changes in assumptions, an argument that much bears on 
the central claims of this Article. See Randall Lutter & Christopher DeMuth, Ozone and the 
Constitution at the EPA, ON THE ISSUES, July 1999, at 3. 
9. See DA VIES & MAzUREK, supra note 7, at 130, 147. 
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The Act has nonetheless been subject to telling criticism. The 
foundation of clear air regulation consists of EPA's issuance of na­
tionally uniform ambient air quality standards;10 but in light of the ex­
traordinary diversity of the fifty states, it is not clear that the idea of 
national standards can be rationally defended.11 In addition, both 
lower courts and EPA seem to think that the standard-setting process 
does not and cannot involve consideration of costs.12 But does it make 
sense, or is it even feasible, to say that national standards will be 
founded on an assessment of benefits alone, conducted in a cost vac­
uum ?13 If an improvement in ambient air quality would produce 
health benefits that are small but not trivial, isn't it clear that the im­
provement is justified if compliance costs are trivial, but not if the 
costs are extremely high? There is reason to think that at least in 
some cases, an understanding of costs has affected EP A's decision 
about appropriate standards - but that the cost-benefit balancing has 
been left implicit and free from public scrutiny and review.14 
Perhaps the largest question involves the criteria by which EPA 
decides whether one or another level of regulation is (in the statutory 
phrase) "requisite to protect the public health."15 For most pollutants, 
air quality at various levels is not either "safe" or "not safe"; there are 
diminishing degrees of risk associated with diminishing degrees of ex­
posure. On what basis is a particular level of residual risk said to be 
the appropriate one? What judgments do, or should, enter into that 
conclusion? EPA has been criticized for sometimes suggesting, in an 
unhelpful and conclusory fashion, that it chooses the "safe" level, as if 
this were solely a technocratic judgment and as if "safety" were an on­
off switch,16 when its decision about permissible levels rests instead on 
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (1994). 
11. See James E. Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro- and 
Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323 (1974). For an instructive recent discussion of how 
the "slippage" between law on the books and law in the world actually allows a degree of 
flexibility, and converts seemingly rigid standards into a basis for negotiation and 
pragmatism, see Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative 
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (1999). 
12. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F3d 1027, 1040-41 (D.C. Cir.1999) (per 
curiam); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148-56 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
13. See MARC K. LANDY ET AL., lliE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: 
ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 49-82, 282-84 (1994) (examin­
ing EPA's 1979 effort to revise the air quality standards for ozone and the Bush administra­
tion's attempt to win the support of the Science Advisory Board). 
14. See id.; C. Boyden Gray, The Clean Air Act Under Regulatory Reform, 11 TuL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 235, 235 (1998). 
15. 42 u.s.c. § 7409(b )(1). 
16. See LANDY ET AL., supra note 13, at 282-84. The criticism is not sound as applied to 
the particulates and ozone regulations, where EPA noted diminishing risk with diminishing 
exposure levels; but here too, EP A's explanation leaves many open questions. 
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a series of political, scientific, and economic judgments and compro­
mises. 
There are two problems with this state of affairs. The first involves 
democratic deliberation.17 If EPA does not give a clear sense of the 
range of adverse effects, and if it does not say why one set of such ef­
fects calls for regulation and another does not, the public and its rep­
resentatives are not informed of the nature of the underlying ques­
tions, and they are unable to evaluate the choices actually made. 
Under EPA's articulated position, a purely technical issue (would a 
certain level be safe?) is sometimes substituted, at least publicly, for 
the real and more complicated ones (what level of safety is appropri­
ate in light of all the relevant factors? why should one level of regula­
tion be preferred to another?). 
The second problem involves sound regulatory policy. Any pro­
posed national standard could be loosened or tightened, and the ques­
tion is whether the agency has chosen the optimal, or at least a rea­
sonable, regulatory "point." Without a clear and (to the extent 
possible) quantified presentation of the expected environmental bene­
fits of the various altematives,18 there can be no assurance that the 
agency has chosen that point, rather than one that is too strict or too 
lenient. 
C. A Remarkable Decision and a New Doctrine 
In its extraordinary decision in American Trucking Ass'ns v. 
EPA,19 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum­
bia Circuit responded to this last concern in the strongest possible 
terms. It held that as interpreted by EPA, the key provisions of the 
Clean Air Act - those that give EPA authority to issue national air 
quality standards - represent an unconstitutional delegation of legis­
lative power.20 The decision announces the birth of a new nondelega­
tion doctrine, one with potentially large implications for regulatory 
policy. Under the new doctrine, open-ended statutory terms will be 
invalidated unless agencies are able to specify the governing legal cri­
teria - to discipline their own authority through narrowing interpre­
tations. 
17. See id. 
18. Costs are of course important too. As discussed below, the prevailing view forbids 
EPA from considering costs, and my basic proposal does not challenge that prevailing view. 
I do, however, raise some doubts about it below. See infra Section VI.C. 
19. 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), rehearing en bane denied, Nos. 97-1440, 
97-1441, 1999 WL 979463 (D.C. Cir. Oct 29, 1999). 
20. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1033. 
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The new nondelegation doctrine is remarkable for many reasons. 
First, the Supreme Court has not used the doctrine to invalidate a fed­
eral statute since (or for that matter before) 1935,21 and hence any 
such decision by a court of appeals is reasonably taken to mark a fresh 
departure. Second, the new doctrine does not require Congress to 
legislate with clarity. It says instead that if Congress has not been 
clear, agencies must act on their own, to set out limits on their own le­
gal authority. Third, there now appears to be a genuine doctrine in 
place; American Trucking represents no isolated decision, but the 
culmination of a line of lower court cases, one of which was a similar 
decision about the Occupational Safety and Health Act.22 The deci­
sion therefore signals a distinctive approach to judicial review of 
agency action. Fourth, the doctrine is conspicuously responsive to 
what the court of appeals saw (and often sees) as a general problem in 
federal regulation: the difficulty of knowing why an agency chooses 
one level of regulation rather than another that is somewhat higher or 
somewhat lower. 
The new doctrine raises a number of questions. The narrowest 
(though far from unimportant) issue has to do with the fate of EPA 
rulemaking with respect to national ambient air quality standards 
("NAAQS"). What, if anything, can EPA do in the future? The ques­
tion is significant both because of its consequences for implementation 
of the Clean Air Act and because of its implications for regulatory 
policy in general. On its face, the American Trucking decision would 
seem to draw into serious constitutional question not only EP A's 
ozone and particulates regulations, but also a wide range of other 
regulations by EPA, and indeed a wide range of decisions by many 
other agencies involved in the protection of health and welfare (and 
other areas as well; consider the Federal Communications Commis­
sion). And what, exactly, is the relationship between the new doctrine 
and ordinary judicial review to test whether agency action has been 
"arbitrary" or "capricious"? An especially large question, and the 
central focus here, has to do with how American Trucking exposes 
continuing problems with the design and implementation of environ­
mental regulation as a whole and the Clean Air Act in particular, a 
statute whose key provisions seem to depend on implausible assump­
tions, and under which EPA has sometimes hidden crucial questions 
of value with uninformative platitudes. 
21. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
22. See International Union v. OSHA, 938 F.3d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
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D. Goals and Plans 
In this Article, my most general goal is to understand current diffi­
culties with environmental policy, the Clean Air Act, and EPA prom­
ulgation of ambient air quality standards, and to see how EPA and 
courts might perform a constructive role in making things better 
rather than worse. My simplest claim is that EPA should undertake 
the two tasks identified above; it should specify the range of benefits 
that it believes will follow from the regulation it seeks to impose, in­
cluding a discussion of the benefits from more lenient and more strin­
gent alternatives and a treatment of the residual risks under the vari­
ous regulatory regimes. It should also explain why it believes that the 
chosen regulation is preferable to the alternatives. 
Steps in these directions would satisfy the legitimate concerns of 
most critics of EP A's performance under the Clean Air Act and also 
of the court of appeals in American Trucking. Such steps also have 
broad applicability and would represent a new departure of their own 
in administrative law, covering the activities of EPA under a wide 
range of statutes and also the activities of (for example) the Occupa­
tional Safety and Health Administration, the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Admini­
stration. Steps of this sort would not amount to a nondelegation doc­
trine, new or old. But they are designed to promote both rule-of-law 
values and sound regulatory policy, in a way that should respond to 
growing understandings about current problems in environmental 
policy and the administrative state. 
I have three more particular goals. The first is to reject the non­
delegation doctrine, both old and new, as a way of ensuring better and 
more transparent policy analysis by EPA and other agencies. That is­
sue raises large questions about democratic accountability and about 
the appropriate role of courts in reviewing agency action. I suggest 
that although the new doctrine has considerable appeal, this is not 
really a nondelegation doctrine at all, and the relevant goals would be 
better accomplished through a form of more conventional (but better 
informed) judicial review of agency action. The Clean Air Act is 
hardly unconstitutional, for it is possible to generate an interpretation 
of the Act that imposes both "floors" and "ceilings" on agency action. 
My second goal is to propose a contemporary role for the nondele­
gation doctrine in American public law. I claim that the doctrine is 
properly held in reserve for extreme cases - that it serves as a genu­
ine, but judicially underenforced, constitutional norm - and that it 
operates as a legitimate tool of statutory construction. More impor­
tantly, I contend that the doctrine is not so much dead as relocated. 
Its current home can be found not in cases invalidating open-ended 
grants of authority, but in the many decisions using various "clear 
statement" principles to discipline legislative and administrative ac-
312 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:303 
tion.23 When courts require Congress to speak clearly in order to 
authorize an agency to raise a serious constitutional problem, or to 
apply a statute extraterritorially or retroactively, they are applying a 
narrower and more targeted version of the nondelegation doctrine -
a version that requires Congress to focus, with particularity, on certain 
especially sensitive questions. By requiring congressional rather than 
merely executive deliberation on those questions, the various "clear 
statement" principles operate as a nondelegation doctrine in another 
guise. As such, the principles are easily defended, for they promote 
the key functions of the nondelegation doctrine without carrying the 
risks of the old and new versions. 
My third goal is to discuss possible improvements in the operation 
of the Clean Air Act, at the legislative, administrative, and judicial 
levels, improvements that might respond to various concerns about 
EPA performance, including the concerns expressed in American 
Trucking. I attempt to explain how the Act seems based on the (false) 
assumption that pollutants generally have "safe thresholds," and how 
this assumption has seriously impaired both regulatory policymaking 
and democratic deliberation. I also suggest that the Act should be in­
terpreted, or if necessary amended, to allow and require EPA to en­
gage in "health-health tradeoffs" - and also to take account of costs 
in setting national standards. In particular, I emphasize that EPA 
should engage in more specific and quantitative assessments of the 
hazardous effects of pollution at various levels, so as to increase the 
transparency of its decisions. It could even make sense for EPA to 
move in the direction of the "quality-adjusted life years" approach, 
designed to provide a concrete sense of the benefits of regulatory al­
ternatives.24 Under such an approach, EPA would attempt to specify 
the range of "quality-adjusted life years" likely to be saved by a regu­
lation, and it would also indicate the degree of savings that would jus­
tify a regulation. But because of the harmful side effects of aggressive 
judicial review, courts should play only a secondary and catalytic role 
- embodied in certain recent and quite innovative procedural devel­
opments in administrative law, above all the "remand without invali­
dation." As we will see, this procedural route is administrative law's 
newest species of minimalism, indeed a form of democracy-promoting 
minimalism.25 The central point is that EPA should undertake such 
inquiries on its own. 
23. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000), 
for a catalogue. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional 
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 V AND. L. REV. 593 (1992) 
(discussing clear statement principles in general). 
24. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1039-40 & n.5. 
25. For a general discussion of judicial minimalism, see SUNS1EIN, supra note 6. 
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This Article comes in six parts. Part II deals with the Clean Air 
Act and in particular with the artificiality of the inquiries that it ap­
pears to make central to EP A's task. Part ill explores the old non­
delegation doctrine, the development of the new nondelegation doc­
trine, and the use of the doctrine in American Trucking and related 
cases. Part IV evaluates the new doctrine, explains why the Clean Air 
Act is constitutionally unproblematic, and suggests an alternative ap­
proach. Part V discusses the proper approaches to the Act from Con­
gress, EPA, and reviewing courts. Part VI is a brief conclusion. 
II. THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
Overall, the benefits of the Clean Air Act since its enactment in 1970 
clearly outweigh the costs. 
-J. Clarence Davies and Jan Mazurek:26 
Congress should not preclude decisionmakers from considering the eco­
nomic costs and benefits of different policies in the development of 
regulations. 
-Kenneth Arrow et al.27 
Most environmental initiatives of the past seemed expensive and ques­
tionable at the time, and today every one of them appears a bargain in 
retrospect. Looking back on the present a few decades hence, society 
will consider every environmental program running now to have been a 
bargain, and wish more programs had been started sooner. 
A. Setting National Standards 
1. The Key Provisions 
-Gregg Easterbrook28 
The Clean Air Act was enacted in 1970. Though many hundreds 
of pages in length, some of them mind-numbingly specific and de­
tailed,29 the Act offers two remarkably brief provisions designed to set 
the statutory program in motion. 
26. DA VIES & MAzUREK, supra note 7, at 147. 
27. KENNETH J. ARROW ET AL., BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL, 
HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 6 (1996). 
28. GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTII: THE COMING AGE OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL OPTIMISM 210 (1995). 
29. Consider the acid deposition program, which goes so far as to list, by name, every 
plant entitled to emit sulfur dioxide and its permitted emissions level (a flavor: 13,570 tons 
for the Colbert plant, generator number one, in Alabama; 15,430 tons for the Armstrong 
plant, generator number two, in Pennsylvania), see Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651(c) 
(1994), alongside an exceptionally specific program for the granting and trading of emissions 
rights, see 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b ). 
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The first of these provisions, and the central focus here, involves 
national primary ambient air quality standards.30 Here EPA is asked 
to set standards "the attainment and maintenance of which in the 
judgment of the Administrator," based on air quality criteria docu­
ments "and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to 
protect the public health. "31 The second of these provisions involves 
national secondary ambient air quality standards, which EPA must set 
at levels "requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or 
anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air 
pollutant in the ambient air."32 "Welfare" is defined to include "ef­
fects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade materials, animals, 
wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate, damage to and deterioration 
of property, and hazards to transportation, as well as effects on eco­
nomic values and on personal comfort and well-being . . . .  "33 For sec­
ondary standards, involving welfare rather than health, there is no 
provision for an "adequate margin of safety." But the secondary stan­
dards are anticipated to be more stringent than the primary ones; no­
tice in particular the statutory emphasis on plant and animal life. 
These provisions have three especially noteworthy features. First, 
they seem at first glance not to contemplate any consideration of cost 
in the standard-setting process.34 Primary standards are based on 
health, apparently to be assessed in a cost vacuum, while secondary 
standards are based on welfare, also apparently to be assessed without 
regard to cost. This is not at all an inevitable reading of the relevant 
provisions; perhaps the level "requisite to protect the public health" 
and "welfare" is a function of cost, not only benefit; but the prevailing 
interpretation is otherwise.35 Second, the standards are fully national 
- even though political judgments about air quality vary greatly from 
state to state, and even though the effects of improved air quality (on 
the cost and benefit sides) are highly variable from one state to an­
other. Finally, both provisions appear to contemplate the existence of 
"safe thresholds." The basic idea is that EPA should ensure that air is 
"safe" and that public welfare is "protected." 
What makes this last idea distinctive is its artificiality. To be sure, 
we could imagine pollutants for which the evidence indicated a point 
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)-(b ). 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(l) (emphasis added). 
32. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
33. 42 u.s.c. § 7602(h). 
34. American Trucking confirms this reading. See 175 F.3d 1027, 104041 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (per curiam). For the initial holding to this effect, see Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 
F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
35. See Lead Indus., 647 F.2d at 1148-56. 
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of "no risk" or "de minimis risk." At least in theory,'it is possible to 
construct a dose-response curve for which risks effectively vanish at a 
certain defined point. But for most pollutants, there are diminishing 
degrees of risk, associated with diminishing degrees of pollution.36 
"Safety" is not an off-on switch; it is a matter of degree. When it is 
said that a certain level of pollution is "safe," what is really meant is 
that the residual risk is acceptable or tolerable - not that there is no 
risk at all. Consider, for example, this commendably direct testimony 
from the Chair of EP A's Scientific Advisory Committee's panel on 
ozone and particulates, unambiguously confessing the impossible na­
ture of the task imposed on EPA by the Act: 
Based on information now available, it appears that ozone may elicit a 
continuum of biological responses down to background concentrations. 
It is critical to understand that a biological response does not necessarily 
imply an adverse health effect. Nevertheless, this means that the para­
digm of selecting a standard at the lowest-observable-effects-level and 
then providing an '"adequate margin of safety"' is not possible. It fur­
ther means that risk assessments must play a central role in identifying an 
appropriate level.37 
How might we explain the enactment of provisions that seem at 
once so vague, rigid, and artificial? Much of the answer lies in the dis­
tinctive political dynamic of environmental debates in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, in which citizens wanted air to be "safe" and politi­
cians who failed to respond were at great risk.38 We might even de­
scribe the result as "1970s environmentalism," a form of thinking that 
accomplished a great deal of good, by producing rapid decreases in 
pollution levels, but that also seems increasingly anachronistic, even 
counterproductive. In the 1970s in particular, politicians would pro­
ceed at their peril if they asserted that "safety" could be compromised 
by other goals.39 At the same time, politicians were affected by, and 
doubtless catered to, the pervasive psychological urge for certainty, as 
confirmed by evidence that people are willing to pay a great deal for 
"no risk" and much less for "substantially less risk."40 Thus, for exam-
36. See, e.g., LANDY ET AL., supra note 13, at 55-56, 78-79. 
37. EPA's Rulemakings on the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate 
Matter and Ozone: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 89 (1997) (prepared statement of George T. 
Woolf, Former Chairman, EPA's Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee). 
38. See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federali­
zation of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & 0RG. 313, 333-38 (1985) (describing a "Politi­
cians' Dilemma" that forced lawmakers to pass more stringent statutes than they originally 
wanted). 
39. See, e.g., id. at 336. 
40. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); George Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings 
(1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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ple, people are willing to pay more for a reduction of a risk from 0.1 to 
0.0 than from 0.3 to 0.1.41 The idea that the Clean Air Act would pro­
duce "safety" rather than "reduced risk" made it far easier to support 
and far harder to challenge. 
Undoubtedly Congress believed that it was delegating to EPA the 
power to be reasonable rather than unreasonable, and in any case the 
Act allowed various safeguards in the event that compliance proved to 
be excessively costly.42 The most important safeguard has consisted in 
a form of (implicitly authorized) civil disobedience on the part of all 
relevant actors, including EPA. The result has been a complex pro­
gram for nonattainment areas43 and a number of illuminating episodes; 
thus EPA was simply not prepared to shut down automobile traffic in 
Los Angeles, a step that would have been necessary to produce com­
pliance with national air quality standards.44 
2. Problems and Puzzles 
All of these points have created serious difficulties for EPA in 
practice. The first problem has to do with expense. For nonthreshold 
pollutants,45 it seems both natural and sensible to assess further reduc­
tions in terms of their cost. H, for example, the expense of reducing 
sulfur dioxide from 0.3 ppm to 0.2 ppm is trivial, then the reduction is 
almost certainly worthwhile (unless the dose-response curve has a 
most peculiar shape46). Even if there is little direct evidence of ad­
verse human health effects at 0.2 ppm, this is likely to be because of 
the limited data, rather than because of an absence of such effects. 
But matters look very different if the cost would run into the tens of 
billions of dollars. When benefits are highly uncertain, it is peculiar to 
say that EPA cannot consider cost, especially since health gains are 
almost inevitable as permissible exposure levels decline.47 
41. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 40, at 268-69. 
42. For an outline, see Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 266-69 (1976). 
43. See Oean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-15 (1994). 
44. See Krier, supra note 11, at 335-41 (describing EPA's abandonment of a 1973 plan to 
ration gasoline in the Los Angeles area). 
45. These are pollutants that have some possibility of some adverse health impact at any 
exposure level above zero. 
46. For example, one that would show no health benefits from a reduction from 0.3 ppm 
to 0.2 ppm, notwithstanding health benefits from a reduction from 0.4 ppm to 03 ppm. 
47. As noted below, it seems that cost considerations were relevant to EPA's decision 
not to reduce the particulates standard further than it did, since some data indicated possibly 
significant benefits from further reductions. See infra app. tbl.11. 
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In light of this point, some critics have suggested that some kind of 
cost-benefit balancing inevitably occurs at EPA.48 At least publicly, 
BP A denies this claim.49 Consider Administrator Browner's sugges­
tion: 
Costs of meeting the standards and related factors have never been con­
sidered in setting the national ambient air quality standards themselves 
. . . . [T]he focus has been entirely on health, risk, exposure and damage 
to the environment . . . . And the American public deserves to know 
whether the air in its cities and counties is unsafe or not; that question 
should never be confused with the separate issues of how long it may 
take or how much it may cost to reduce pollution to safe levels. Indeed, 
to allow costs and related factors to influence the determination of what 
levels protect public health would be to mislead the American public in a 
very fundamental way.50 
Only insiders know for certain whether EPA does in fact consider 
costs in issuing national ambient air quality standards.51 But consider, 
by way of contrast and as a possible clue, the Administrator's explana­
tion of the 1979 revision of the ozone standard: 
The Clean Air Act, as the Administrator interprets it, does not permit 
him to take factors such as cost of attainment or attainability into ac­
count in setting the level of the standard; the standard is to be one that 
will adequately protect public health . . . . [He] recognizes ... that con­
trolling CO to very low levels is a task that can have significant impact on 
economic and social activity. This recognition causes [him] to reject as 
an option the setting of a zero-level standard . . . . However, it is public 
health, and not economic impact, that must be the compelling factor in 
the decision.52 
48. See, e.g., George Eads, The Confusion of Goals and Instruments: The Explicit Con­
sideration of Cost in Setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards, in To BREATIIE 
FREELY: RISK, CONSENT, AND AIR 223, 227-29 (Mary Gibson ed., 1985). See also the sug­
gestion in Farber, supra note 11, at 315-18, about the distinctive "slippage" between law and 
reality in the context of environmental law. 
49. See Carbon Monoxide: Proposed Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards and Announcement of Public Meetings, 45 Fed. Reg. 55,066 (1980) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R pt. 50). 
50. Clean Air Act: Ozone and Particulate Matter Standards: Hearings Before the Sub­
comm. on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and Nuclear Safety of the Senate Env't and 
Pub. Works Comm., 105th Cong. 282 (1997) [hereinafter Clean Air Hearings] (statement of 
Carol M. Browner, Administrator, EPA). 
51. As noted, EP A's failure to require more stringent regulation of particulates provides 
some evidence of cost consideration. On EP A's own numbers, more stringent regulation 
might have provided $4 billion in increased benefits. See infra app. tbl.11. If these benefits 
were possible, why did EPA not require greater stringency, if not because of some cost con­
sciousness? 
52. Carbon Monoxide: Proposed Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Stan­
dards and Announcement of Public Meetings, 45 Fed. Reg. at 55,072. 
318 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:303 
This explanation, difficult to follow though it is, is most naturally 
taken as a suggestion that despite the nominal irrelevance of cost, 
costs do matter in the context of standard-setting for nonthreshold 
pollutants. 
The second problem has to do with federalism. The Act requires 
uniform national standards; but in practice, EPA authorizes a consid­
erable amount of variation among states. For example, there is little 
question that the exceedingly high costs of attainment will, for many 
states, produce frequent violations of national requirements - and 
this has in fact turned out to be the case.s3 Several decades after the 
initial issuance of ambient air quality standards for ozone, for exam­
ple, over 50 million people live in areas that are frequently in violation 
of national standards.54 Smaller numbers - but still many millions -
of people live in nonattainment areas for other pollutants.ss 
The upshot is that national standards have mostly served not as 
real law, but as targets or aspirations56 - flexible goals to which the 
federal government can point without, however, insisting on compli­
ance unless or until it is reasonable. This aspirational quality of na­
tional standards has led Congress to enact an increasingly complex set 
of provisions for nonattainment areas, provisions that anticipate com­
pliance in certain areas over a period of many years and that, in prac­
tice, therefore recognize the existence of reasonable variations across 
states.s7 Indeed it is contemplated, by the 1990 revision of the Act, 
that one of the nation's largest urban areas, Los Angeles, will not be in 
compliance until 2010 at the earliest.ss 
This point leads to a more general one, bearing on cost-benefit 
balancing as well as on federalism. EPA's official position that 
standard-setting is cost-blind is complemented by explicit statements 
to the effect that cost, efficiency, and feasibility are relevant in making 
53. See, e.g., Eads, supra note 48, at 1228-35; John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism 
Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995); Farber, supra note 11, at 303-04; 
James Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal System -
And Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226 (1995); see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Rich­
ard N. Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The Limits of Aspirational 
Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429 (1978). 
54. See J. CLARENCE DA VIES & JAN MAzUREK, REGULATING POLLUTION: DOES THE 
U.S. SYSTEM WORK? 17 fig.l (1997). 
55. See id. (showing that about nine million people live in areas not meeting national 
standards for particulates, about eleven million live in areas not meeting national standards 
for carbon monoxide, and about five million live in areas not meeting standards for lead). 
56. See Eads, supra note 48, at 226; Henderson & Pearson, supra note 53, at 1429, 1442-
45. 
57. The Clean Air Act, 42 §§ 7401-7671q (1994), contains these nonattainment provi­
sions at42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-15, especially at§ 7511. 
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511. 
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choices about compliance.59 In a way these statements are puzzling, 
for the Supreme Court has held that cost, and infeasibility, are 
irrelevant to EP A's decision whether to approve state implementation 
plans.(j() But EPA appears to acknowledge that state implementation 
plans will themselves consider costs, and also that cost will be relevant 
in setting schedules for compliance.61 
Finally, EPA must make hard choices about how safe is safe 
enough, an important question in light of the artificiality of the idea 
that air is either "safe" or "unsafe." EPA's choices involve not merely 
the facts, but also evaluative judgments about acceptable degrees of 
risk. A central question has to do with the ingredients of any judg­
ment that a certain risk is too high. There are many important ques­
tions here, which include:62 
• The size of the population at risk, that is, whether 100,000, a mil­
lion, or tens of millions of people are at risk.63 
• The nature of the population at risk - for example, whether it 
involves a large number of children, whether only elderly people 
are affected, whether those affected have a preexisting condition, 
such as asthma.64 An important question is whether any "lives 
saved" number would involve young people or old people; there 
is less need for a policy that would (say) increase life expectancy 
by one year for those over 80 than for a policy that would in­
crease life expectancy by sixty years for those under 10. This 
point suggests that EPA might reasonably concern itself not with 
lives saved, but with life-years saved, a point to which I will re­
turn.65 
• The likelihood of harm for particular members of the affected 
population, that is, whether the likelihood of incurring harm is 1 
in 1,000, 1 in 10,000, or 1 in a million.66 Thus, for example, the 
plurality of the Supreme Court held in Industrial Union Depart-
59. See Clean Air Hearings, supra note 50, at 282-83 (statement of Carol M. Browner, 
Administrator, EPA). 
60. See Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 265 (1976). 
61. See ROBERT PERCNAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 123-24 (Supp. 
1998) (outlining BP A's "Co= on Sense Implementation Plan"). 
62 See American Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 175 F3d 1027, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per cu­
riam). 
63. See, e.g., R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE 
CLEAN AIR Acr 275-76 (1983) (discussing lead). The inlportance of considering population 
size is stressed in JAMES T. HAMILTON & W. KIP VISCUS!, CALCULATING RISKS? 91-108 
(1999). 
64. See MELNICK, supra note 63, at 275-76. 
65. See infra Section VI.A.4. 
66. See Clean Air Hearings, supra note 50, at 280-81 (statement of Carol M. Browner, 
Administrator, EPA). 
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ment v. American Petroleum Institute ("Benzene Case")61 that 
OSHA may regulate only "significant risks," and that a risk of 
one in a billion could not count as significant.68 OSHA now con­
cludes that a lifetime annual risk of 1.64/1,000 would count as sig­
nificant. 69 But undoubtedly the importance of addressing such a 
risk will depend on other factors, notably including the size of the 
affected population. 
•The severity of the risk - for example, whether it involves cancer 
or mortality risks, or increased hospital admissions, bronchitis, 
respiratory symptoms, lost work days, or what EPA calls minor 
restricted activity days.70 
Although EPA considers all of these questions in issuing national 
standards,71 it has developed no clear guidelines to discipline its judg­
ment about when one or another level of regulation is appropriate. It 
has not said, for example, that if 100,000 people face a cancer risk of 
1/1,000, regulation is presumptively desirable, but if 10,000 face a 
1/1,000 chance of minor respiratory problems, regulation is presump­
tively not desirable.72 A reading of EPA's voluminous documents on 
the major air pollutants provides an enormous amount of data, but lit­
tle information on the answers that would trigger a decision to in­
crease or decrease regulation. As we will see, all of the various points 
noted above might reasonably be turned into a kind of global figure, 
for example "quality-adjusted life years," designed to quantify the 
various benefits from regulation.73 
One final note: An obvious and important question has to do with 
the distributional effects of national ambient air quality standards. 
67. 448 U.S. 6ITT (1980). 
68. See Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 612. 
69. See Building & Constrs. Trade Dep't v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
70. See U.S. EPA INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES & ECONOMICS GROUP, OFFICE OF AIR 
QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES FOR TIIE 
PARTICULATE MATTER AND OZONE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS AND 
PROPOSED REGIONAL HAzE RULE 12-43 (1997) [hereinafter RIA]. 
71. See, e.g., The Science Behind EPA's Proposed Revisions to the National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards for Ozone and Particulate Matter, Parts I-Ill: Hearings Before the Sub· 
comm. on Energy and Environment of the House Comm. on Science, 105th Cong. 455-56 
(1997) ("I determined that setting an appropriate air quality standard for a pollutant for 
which there is no discernible threshold means that factors such as the nature and severity of 
the health effects involved, and the nature and size of the sensitive populations exposed, are 
very important."); see also LANDY ET AL., supra note 13, at 44-82 (discussing ozone); 
MELNICK, supra note 63, at 269-76 (discussing lead). 
72. Compare OSHA, which has said that if a risk is 1.64/1,000, regulation will be pre­
sumed desirable and the risk will be found significant. See infra note 243. 
73. See Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, Where Now for Saving Lives?, LAW &.  
CONTEMP. PR.OBS., Autumn 1976, a t  5, 11; see also American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 
F.3d 1027, 1039-40 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
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Who bears the costs? Who receives the benefits? Full information is 
not available. But an early study finds that under the Act, poor peo­
ple, and African Americans, are net gainers, whereas wealthy people, 
and whites, are net losers74 - perhaps not a shocking finding in light 
of the fact that many of the adverse effects of air pollution are concen­
trated in large cities. 
In sum: The Act has produced many improvements in air quality, 
but the questions about federalism, cost-benefit analysis, and the con­
cept of "safety" raise serious concerns about the Act and about BP A 
performance. As we will see, these criticisms have implications for the 
constitutionality of the Act and the resurgence of the nondelegation 
doctrine, as well as for more general concerns of democracy and ac­
countability. 
B. Revising National Standards - and the Tyranny of the Status Quo 
In 1971, BP A issued six national standards, governing ozone, par­
ticulates, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and total 
suspended particulates 2.5.75 In 1978, EPA issued a seventh standard, 
involving lead; it did so as a result of a court order.76 These seven 
regulations amount to the centerpiece of BP A's regulatory system for 
the control of national ambient air quality. 
Of course it would be extremely surprising if the standards origi­
nally adopted in 1971 and 1978 turn out to survive new scientific evi­
dence, and many people have urged that adjustments are desirable, in 
the direction of both tightening and loosening existing requirements. 
Congress has thus created an "agency-forcing" mechanism designed to 
require BP A reconsideration of primary and secondary standards. 
Under the Act, BP A is required to review the relevant criteria and 
standards at least once every five years, and to revise them "as appro­
priate" under the statutory guidelines.77 EPA is specifically required 
to consider, and to explain any significant departures from, the rec­
ommendations of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee 
("CASAC"), an independent committee established specifically in or­
der to advise the Administrators on air quality criteria and standards.78 
A great deal of time and expense is necessary to respond to new scien-
74. See Henry M. Peskin, Environmental Policy and the Distribution of Benefits and 
Costs, in CURRENT ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 144, 147-59 (Paul Portney ed., 
1978). 
75. See infra app. for details. 
76. See id. 
77. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(l) (1994). 
78. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(d)(2)(B), 7607(d)(3). 
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tific information, thus making the revision process extremely cumber­
some. 
So much for the statutory requirements; the possibility of litigation 
raises further complexities. The most general point is that EPA is vul­
nerable to suits by those seeking more stringent controls and new 
regulations based on apparent evidence of hazards at existing levels.79 
If EPA does not act within the statutory period, or if it decides not to 
impose more stringent controls, it will predictably be faced by a suit 
from an environmental organization - one that, in view of likely sci­
entific evidence, has a nontrivial chance of success.80 This is so espe­
cially in light of a recent judicial suggestion that the Administrator 
may be barred from declining "to establish a margin of safety in the 
face of documented adverse health effects."81 But EPA is also vulner­
able to challenges by industry whenever it tightens a standard. Crea­
tive lawyers have a quite good chance of successfully challenging an 
EPA regulation whether it has tightened, or refused to tighten, exist­
ing standards.82 
It is therefore possible to venture a prediction: The day will even­
tually come when the same court of appeals holds that EPA has be­
haved unlawfully both for regulating above a certain level and also for 
not regulating below that level! The basic point is that the centrality 
of litigation to environmental protection creates a new form of tyr­
anny of the status quo - a great deal of inertia in favor of the existing 
regulatory framework, whatever its content. The general problem for 
modern administrative law is that because of the complexity of the sci­
entific evidence, skilled advocates are highly likely to be able to find a 
serious problem in the agency's rationale, a factor that makes rule­
making extremely cumbersome and increasingly encourages agencies 
to avoid it altogether.83 
C. The Record 
Thus far it might be tempting to be quite skeptical of the Act - to 
think that it rests on false assumptions, that it foolishly ignores costs 
79. For recent evidence, see, for example, American Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388 
(D.C. Cir. 1998), and Corrosion ProofFittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
80. See, e.g., American Lung Ass'n, 134 F3d at 389 (requiring EPA to give a better justi­
fication for its failure to establish a new standard for sulfur dioxide emissions). 
81. Id. at 393 (leaving the issue undecided on the ground that the Administrator did not 
adequately explain her judgment that no public health threat exists). 
82 See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per cu­
riam). 
83. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 41 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 59, 60-62 (1995). 
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and state-by-state variations, that it invites excessive litigation, and 
that it is an extremely crude foundation for regulatory policy. There is 
considerable sense in these skeptical reactions. But it must also be ac­
knowledged that the Act has done a great deal of good - indeed, that 
reductions in air pollution can plausibly be counted among the sub­
stantial success stories in regulatory government in the last half­
century.84 The good news is that for all of the pollutants, there have 
been large improvements in ambient air quality. Consider the fol­
lowing table:85 














*PM10 changes are based on 1988-95 data 
Emissions change (%) 
-16 
-32 




Even the cost-benefit ratio appears to be quite good. A general 
review contains many criticisms of American efforts at environmental 
protection, but concludes that "the benefits of the Clean Air Act seem 
clearly to outweigh the costs."86 Thus a study of EPA rulemaking be­
tween 1990 and 1995 found that the costs outweighed the benefits by 
no less than $70 billion. 87 
On the other hand, better tools could have produced similar results 
at a far lower cost. For example, there is evidence that with economic 
incentives, EPA could have achieved the same benefits at one-quarter 
of the costs.88 There is also a problem of poor priority-setting. EPA's 
own studies suggest that it is not devoting resources to the most seri­
ous problems and indeed that inadequate priority-setting is a particu­
lar problem for clean air regulation, where large problems (such as in­
door air pollution) receive relatively little attention.89 An important 
84. See, e.g., EAS1ERBROOK, supra note 28, at 181-83. 
85. See DAVIES & MAzUREK, supra note 7, at 17 (calculated from data from U.S. EPA 
OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS REsEARCH, NATIONAL AIR 
QUALITY AND EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT (1995), at 69-77 (1996)). 
86. DA VIES & MAzUERK, supra note 54, at 31. 
87. See id. But see LUTIER, supra note 8, at 2-3. 
88. See TOM TIETENBURG, EMISSIONS TRADING 38-59 (1985). 
89. See DA VIES & MAzUREK, supra note 54, at 24-30. 
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task for the future is to ensure that EPA devotes limited public and 
private resources to the most serious environmental hazards.90 
D. Particulates and Ozone at EPA: A Case in Point 
These issues are hard to understand in the abstract; it will be useful 
to understand them in light of EP A's recent effort to revise its regula­
tions governing particulates and ozone. Notably, the origins of the 
new particulates standards can be found not in an independent deci­
sion by EPA, but in a 1993 suit by the American Lung Association, 
which sought to compel EPA to complete its review of the particulate 
matter ("PM") standard.91 The district court ordered EPA to issue a 
proposed rule by November 29, 1996, and a final rule by July 18, 1997. 
Here are the key points in EP A's analysis and justification, which 
raise recurring issues about what findings agencies must make during 
standard-setting in the environmental arena. 
1. The New Standards: Massive Scientific Evidence 
The final rules for particulates and ozone were based on a massive 
amount of evidence, involving thousands of pages of documents.92 
EP A's public justification for these standards is extremely long and 
impressively detailed but in important respects vague and conclusory. 
It is filled with legalistic arguments, with reports on specific studies 
having ambiguous implications for the particular issue of what 
standard to select, and with qualitative judgments that leave a great 
deal of uncertainty about the magnitude of the effects.93 To EPA's 
credit, it does not suggest that "safety" is an on-off switch; it 
acknowledges that this is a question of degree.94 But EPA does not 
explain, in quantitative terms, why the level it chose is preferable to 
more stringent or less stringent alternatives. 
90. This is a general theme of BREYER, supra note 5. In a claim of direct relevance to 
the central claims of this Article, Breyer rejects the idea of congressional priority-setting and 
makes a plea instead for executive branch oversight of regulatory activity. See id. at 90-102. 
91. See American Lung Ass'n v. Browner, 884 F. Supp. 345 (D. Ariz. 1994). The district 
court presided over an ambitious timing schedule, one that was resisted by EPA as exces­
sively ambitious in view of the need to compile and process a great deal of relevant informa­
tion. 
92. Some of the data upon which EPA relied in making its conclusions is held by third 
parties and has not been released to the public. The nonpublic nature of this information 
raises some problems with EP A's regulation, because without access to the data, it is hard to 
evaluate some of EP A's factual claims. 
93. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 
38,652, 38,650-81 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
94. See id. at 38,656. 
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A general review of the evidence suggests that there could well be 
both high benefits and high costs from the new particulates standard.95 
For the new ozone standard, both costs and benefits appear 
significantly lower.96 EPA offered a great deal of detail about the 
harms apparently caused by particulates and ozone at existing levels. 
It also acknowledged uncertainties in the evidence. There are 
extensive discussions of the scientific literature. In an illustrative 
comment, Administrator Browner publicly defended the 0.08 ppm 
standard for ozone: 
because, though it is in the middle of the range recommended for consid­
eration by CASAC and the EPA staff paper, as a policy choice it reflects 
the lowest level recommended by individual CASAC panel members and 
it is the lowest level tested and shown to cause effects in controlled hu­
man-exposure health studies.97 
EPA ultimately chose a standard of 15165 for "fine" particulates -
more specifically, an annual standard, for P�, of 15 µg/m3, based on 
the three-year average of the annual arithmetic mean Phlz.s 
concentrations; it also set an hourly standard of 65 µg/m3, based on the 
three-year average of the 98th percentile of 24-hour Phlz.s 
concentrations. These were new standards; previous standards 
involved "coarse" particulates, PMi.0•98 There is some dispute about 
the extent to which the new standards represent a significant increase 
in stringency, because they govern particulates of a smaller diameter, 
and relative stringency, in any geographic region, depends on the size 
distribution of the particulate matter in that region; in areas 
dominated by coarse particulates, including some western cities, there 
is little increase in stringency.99 EPA set a 0.08 ppm standard for 
ozone averaged over an eight-hour period, replacing the previous 0.12 
ppm standard, averaged over a one-hour period. 
The heart of EPA's analysis is as follows.100 (I discuss particulates 
as an illustration.) EPA begins by referring to "the greatly expanded 
95. See infra app. tbl.11. 
96. See infra app. tbl.12. 
97. Clean Air Act Hearings, supra note 50, at 279-80 (statement of Carol M. Browner, 
Administrator, EPA). 
98. PMi0 refers to particulates with an aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to 10 
micrometers; P� refers to particulates with diameter less than or equal to 2.5 micrometers. 
With the new P� standards, EPA also tightened the standard for PMi0 by limiting permis­
sible deviations from the previous standard. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,652. 
99. See Robert Yuhnke, Particles of Concern, ENVTL. FORUM, March/April 1997, at 24, 
25-29 (contending that the simultaneous change in regulation of the two kinds of particulates 
will decrease regulation and increase health risks in various places, including Denver). 
100. See generally National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 
Fed. Reg. 38,652 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
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body of community epidemiological studies."101 This evidence shows a 
range of adverse health effects, including premature mortality and 
increased hospital admissions; and there is also evidence that children, 
the elderly, and asthmatics are most vulnerable to these effects. More 
particular evidence emerges from quantitative risk estimates from two 
"example cities," estimates that include a judgment that existing 
standards create residual risks of "hundreds of premature deaths each 
year, hundreds to thousands of respiratory-related hospital 
admissions, and tens of thousands of additional respiratory[-]related 
symptoms in children."102 (In an inadvertently hilarious qualification, 
EPA adds that the "epidemiological findings cannot be wholly 
attributed to inappropriate or incorrect statistical methods, 
misspecification of concentration-effect models, biases in study design 
or implementation, measurement errors" and the like.103) EPA notes 
that the results "should be interpreted cautiously," especially in light 
of "the lack of demonstrated mechanisms" to explain the 
epidemiological findings, but should be taken to "provide ample 
reason to be concerned that there are detectable health effects 
attributable to PM at levels below the current NAAQS."104 
BP A's basic claim is that "the increase in relative risk is small for 
the most serious outcomes" but "significant from an overall public 
health perspective, because of the large number of individuals in sensi­
tive populations that are exposed to ambient PM, as well as the signifi­
cance of the health effects involved."105 International evidence, and 
evaluations by over 1,000 experts, supported the view that the existing 
standard was insufficiently protective.106 Much of EPA's discussion 
involves the fact that existing evidence does not reveal mechanisms to 
explain the range of reported adverse effects.107 And frequently EPA 
repeats what appears to be a key phrase, almost a mantra, to the effect 
that the data "provides the basis for decisions on standard levels that 
would reduce risk sufficiently to protect public health with an ade­
quate margin of safety, recognizing that such standards will not be 
risk-free."108 Thus EPA says "there is ample reason to be concerned 
that exposure to ambient PM at levels allowed under the current air 
101. Id. at 38,655. 
102 Id. at 38,656. 
103. Id. at 38,656. 
104. Id. at 38,656-57. 
105. Id. at 38,657. 
106. See id. 
107. See, e.g., id. at 38,664-65. 
108. Id. at 38,674. 
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quality standards presents a serious public health problem."109 EPA 
offers detailed discussions of criticisms of the epidemiological findings 
and offers what appear to be reasonable responses.U0 As we will see, 
EP A's presentation of all the relevant data shows reason for concern 
about adverse health effects at current levels, but leaves many doubts 
about why EPA chose the particular standards it did, rather than stan­
dards somewhat higher or somewhat lower. 
2. Insufficient Consideration of the Alternatives 
To EPA's credit, it does offer some discussion of both less strin­
gent and more stringent alternatives.111 But the discussion is quite 
brief, especially considering the centrality of the comparative ques­
tion. As against the less stringent possibilities, EPA says that "despite 
well recognized uncertainties, the consistency and coherence of the 
epidemiological evidence and the seriousness of the health effects re­
quire a more protective response . . . .  "112 As against those who argued 
for more stringent regulation, EPA said that "the inherent scientific 
uncertainties are too great" and also that such regulation "might result 
in regulatory programs that go beyond those that are needed to effec­
tively reduce risks to public health."113 Studies "provide some sugges­
tion of risks extending to lower concentrations, [but] they do not pro­
vide a sufficient basis for establishing a lower annual standard 
level."114 Because this point is so important, it is worthwhile noting 
that EPA spoke in similarly vague terms for ozone, saying that more 
stringent regulation would prevent 
certain . . .  effects, [that] while judged to be adverse, are transient and re-
versible, . . .  and the more serious effects with greater immediate and po-
tential long-term impacts on health are less certain, both. as to the per­
centage of individuals exposed to various concentrations who are likely 
to experience such effects and as to the long-term significance of these 
effects.115 
These are minimally informative generalities. Hence any reader is 
likely to be puzzled about exactly why EPA chose the particular 
regulations it did - about why it did not regulate either somewhat 
more or somewhat less. A special puzzle is why EPA did not impose 
109. Id. at 38,665. 
110. See id. at 38,658-65. 
111. See id. at38,665-66, 38,674-77. 
112 Id. at 38,675. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 38,676. 
115. Id. at 38,868. 
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more stringent controls on particulates; the Regulatory Impact Analy­
sis116 ("RIA") shows that a more stringent regulation could have pro­
duced $4 billion in increased health benefits.117 The problem is not 
that EPA was careless or offhand; its exhaustive documentation was 
anything but that. The problem is that in the explanation accompa­
nying the final rules, EPA did not attempt to quantify the risks under 
competing standards, nor did it show the basic value judgment that 
would deem one risk too high, another risk acceptable, and another 
risk too low (that is, below the level requisite to protect the public 
health). 
In many ways, the most informative document is the RIA. This is 
the most informative document because it provides actual numbers on 
the benefit (including nonmonetized and monetized quantities) and 
cost sides. It is also a tribute to Executive Order 12,866, requiring 
cost-benefit analysis ("CBA") even when CBA cannot be the basis for 
decision.118 The problem is that in its justification, EPA made little use 
of this document. Indeed, the RIA was written by a separate group in 
North Carolina, and it appears to have had little or no influence on the 
ultimate decision. Some of the benefits calculations appear to have 
been rejected by EPA itself in the official justification. Nonetheless, 
the RIA provides the only systematic discussion of the consequences 
of the approach chosen and of alternative approaches. Here is some 
of what the RIA says: 
1. The new particulates regulation would prevent 350 annual mor­
talities; 6,800 cases of chronic bronchitis; 1,100 cases of acute 
bronchitis; about 1,200 hospital admissions from, for example, 
congestive heart failure (130) and respiratory episodes ( 470); 
106,000 lost work days; and 879,000 minor restricted activity 
days.119 
2. For the selected ozone standard, the new regulation would pre­
vent 0 to 80 deaths, 130 emergency department visits for 
asthma, 29,840 acute respiratory symptoms, 0 to 530 chronic 
bronchitis cases, 0 to 20 hospital admissions for congestive 
heart failure, 0 to 50,440 lost work days, 0 to 420,300 minor re-
116. The RIA was produced pursuant to Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. (1993 com­
pilation) 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (1996), which requires analysis of the costs 
and benefits of major regulations. In this case, the RIA was produced by a separate group 
within EPA, the Innovative Strategies and Economics Group in Research Triangle Park, 
North Carolina. It is not clear to what extent the RIA actually reflects the views of EPA or 
affected the outcome. 
117. See infra app. tbl 11. (The tables in the appendix are taken from information in the 
RIA.) Note that this compares the highest benefit estimate; unfortunately, the RIA does 
not give lowest benefits estimates for the two alternatives. 
118. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. at 639. 
119. See infra app. tbl.2. 
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stricted activity days.120 (Note that in both cases the RIA speci­
fies a range, which is a tribute to candor in the midst of scien­
tific uncertainty.) 
3. All these benefits are monetized: $4.8 million per life saved, 
$120,000 per life-year saved, $12,700 per respiratory illness, 
$16,600 per congestive heart failure for those over 65, $9,000 
for emergency department visits for asthma, $260,000 for 
chronic bronchitis, $83 per lost work day, $38 per minor re­
stricted activity day.121 
4. For ozone, the overall cost-benefit analysis122 shows benefits of 
$0.4 billion (low-end estimate) to $2.1 billion (high-end esti­
mate), and costs of $1.1 billion. For particulates, the benefits 
range from $19 billion to $104 billion, whereas the costs are an­
ticipated to be $8.6 billion. A noteworthy point is that the 
ozone rule might have negative net benefits of $0.7 billion, if 
the low-end estimate is correct; note also that if the health 
benefits of ground-level ozone (discussed below in Section 
VI.A.5) are included in the calculation, the negative net bene­
fits - or more simply net costs - of the rule are higher still. 
5. The RIA also suggests the costs and benefits of the two alterna­
tives.123 The more stringent particulates standard would have 
high-end benefits of $108 billion and costs of $9.4 billion; the 
less stringent would have high-end benefits of $90 and costs of 
$5.5 billion.124 The less stringent ozone standard would have 
high-end benefits of $1.6 billion and costs of $0.9 billion; the 
more stringent would have high-end benefits of $2.9 billion and 
costs of $1.4 billion.125 
A serious gap in the RIA is that it does not give low-end estimates 
for the benefits associated with the alternatives; only high-end esti­
mates are given for these. For the options actually chosen, a range is 
specified, which greatly assists assessment of EP A's judgment. But 
\vithout the range, it is hard to compare the options not chosen. 
An additional problem, reflected in EP A's explanation as a whole, 
is the absence of a detailed assessment - even a wholly benefits-based 
assessment - of why the options that were chosen were deemed supe­
rior to those that were not chosen. The most noteworthy point here is 
that by EP A's own accounting, the more stringent particulates stan-
120. See infra app. tbl3. 
121. See infra app. tbl.4. 
122 See infra app. tbl.12. 
123. See infra app. tbls.11 & 12. 
124. See infra app. tbl.11. 
125. See infra app. tbl.12. 
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dard could have produced $4 billion in greater benefits (on the high­
end estimate). This would seem to count as a substantial improve­
ment in public health, especially considering the fact that each life is 
valued at $4.8 million; translated into lives, the more stringent regula­
tion could prevent more than 200 additional deaths each year! EPA 
did not square this conclusion with its decision not to choose more 
stringent regulation. Indeed, EPA's own calculations showed that a 
tighter particulates standard would have produced far greater health 
benefits than the ozone standard; this leaves a serious unexplained 
anomaly in the two standards taken together.126 A possible explana­
tion for not tightening the particulates standard is that the consensus 
of CASAC members did not support doing so, a consensus that raises 
questions about the RIA itself; but BP A did not offer a "benefits 
analysis" that would resolve these uncertainties. 
In this light, what overall evaluation would be reasonable? If 
BP A's conclusions are correct, the particulates regulation promises 
significant benefits and the ozone regulation promises relatively small 
benefits. The basic problem is that the agency has not explained, in 
concrete terms, why it chose one level of regulation rather than an­
other. Now let us shift to the nondelegation issue. 
III. THE PATH OF THE LAW 
If we can just get our legislators to legislate we'll be able to understand 
their goals well enough. I'm not saying we may not still end up with a 
fair number of clowns as representatives, but at least then it will be be­
cause clowns are what we deserve. 
-John Hart Ely127 
The non-delegation doctrine is almost a complete failure . . . . The time 
has come for the courts to acknowledge that the non-delegation doctrine 
is unsatisfactory .... 
-Kenneth Culp Davis128 
A. The Old Nondelegation Doctrine: One Good Year, Two Hundred 
and Two Bad Years 
Despite its extremely infrequent use, the old nondelegation doc­
trine should be quite familiar. In a nutshell, it requires Congress to 
state an "intelligible principle" by which to guide and limit agency ac-
126. See Lutter & DeMuth, supra note 8, at 3. 
127. JOHNHARTELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
134 (1980). 
128. Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 713 
(1969). 
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tion.129 The motivating idea is that Article I, Section 1, vests legislative 
power in the Congress and that this vesting cannot be waived, even if 
Congress and the public want to do so. If Congress gives the executive 
a "blank check," or states no intelligible principle, it has violated Arti­
cle I. 
According to the standard view, the nondelegation doctrine was a 
core part of the original Constitution, and its abandonment, in the af­
termath of the New Deal, represented a kind of capitulation to per­
ceived national needs.130 I believe that the Constitution does contain a 
nondelegation doctrine; but the standard view is much too simple. For 
one thing, there is no express nondelegation doctrine in the text of the 
Constitution, which must therefore be counted as ambiguous on the 
point.131 To be sure, legislative power is vested in Congress, and it is 
reasonable to infer that the power thus vested cannot be given to 
someone else. But there is no clear textual barrier to delegations, and 
in fact there is no explicit evidence that the Framers and ratifiers of 
the original Constitution believed that it contained a nondelegation 
doctrine.132 Actually the early practice suggested considerable willing­
ness to "delegate" authority. In the second year of the Republic, 
Congress gave the President the power to grant licenses to trade with 
the Indian tribes "by such rules and regulations as the President shall 
prescribe."133 The first Congress provided for military pensions "un­
der such regulations as the President of the United States may di-
129. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 745-47 (D.D.C. 
1971) 
130. See ELY, supra note 129, at 131-34; DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT 
REsPONSIBILITY 13, 37-39, 165-79 (1997); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Adminis­
trative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1237-41 (1994). 
131. As a comparison, consider the German Constitution, which does contain an explicit 
nondelegation principle. Article 80(1) requires that the content, purpose, and extent of the 
legislative authorization be specified in the statute itself. See GRUNDGESTETZ 
[CONSTITUTION) [G.G.) art. 80(1) (F.RG.); see also DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 125-34 (1995). 
132. Consider in this regard the treatment of the interpretive question in Ernest 
Gellhom, Returning to First Principles, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 345, 347-48 (1987), which 
attempts to show the constitutional roots of the nondelegation doctrine (a) by showing that 
John Locke believed in a nondelegation principle, (b) by emphasizing that the Framers 
believed in Locke's contractarian view, and (c) by referring to the Constitution's provision 
for lawmaking. None of this establishes that the Framers accepted a nondelegation doctrine. 
I use this example because Gellhom is one of the outstanding administrative Jaw scholars of 
the last thirty years, and also an enthusiast for the nondelegation doctrine; his inability to 
show a direct constitutional source for the doctrine shows that any judgment on its behalf is 
largely a matter of inferences. 
133. An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 
137 (1790). 
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rect."134 In neither case did Congress issue standards by which to limit 
the President's discretion. 
The standard view also fits uncomfortably with judicial practice. It 
is often remarked that the Supreme Court last used the nondelegation 
doctrine to invalidate a federal statute in 1935. What is less often re­
marked is that the Court first used the nondelegation doctrine to in­
validate a federal statute in exactly the same year. While earlier cases 
had suggested the existence of a nondelegation doctrine,135 the Court 
upheld a number of broad delegations,136 and hence for the first 138 
years of the nation's existence - as well as the last sixty-four years -
no Supreme Court decision struck down a statute on nondelegation 
grounds. 
Let us briefly explore the two decisions of 1935, the nondelegation 
doctrine's only good year. In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,131 the 
Court invalidated a section of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 
saying that "the President is authorized to prohibit the transportation 
in interstate commerce" of oil priced in violation of state-imposed 
production quotas.138 The Court said that the defect lay in the absence 
of standards specifying exactly when the President was to exercise this 
power.139 This is a controversial ruling, fitting poorly with post-World 
War II decisions, and it is most unlikely that the Court would follow it 
today. But the largest decision, one that has not been overruled even 
implicitly, was A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States,140 where 
the Court invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act as a 
whole.141 In invalidating the Act, the Court made three critical points. 
First, the statutory standards were open-ended and self-contradictory 
- no constraint at all on government approval of "codes."142 From 
the statutory language alone, it was very hard to generate ceilings and 
134. An Act Providing for the Payment of the Invalid Pensioners of the United States, 
ch. 24, 1 Stat 95 (1789). 
135. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 404-06 (1928); 
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 510 {1911); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692-93 
(1892); The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (1 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813). 
136. See, e.g., J. W. Hampton, Jr., 276 U.S. at 404-06; Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 510-11. 
137. 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
138. See Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 433 (citing National Industrial Recovery Act 
§ 9(c), Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195, 200 (1934)). 
139. See 293 U.S. at 426-30. 
140. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
141. It is an interesting historical fact that on the day of the decision, President 
Roosevelt did not seem much to object to judicial invalidation of a centerpiece of his New 
Deal, apparently on the theory that the NIRA experiment had been a failure. See KENNETII 
S. DA VIS, FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS 516-17 (1986). 
142 See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 523. 
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floors on governmental action. Second, the Court said that the Act es­
sentially delegated public power to private groups.143 Congress could 
not legitimately authorize private persons to create law in their pre­
ferred form. Because accountable officials did not "filter" efforts at 
private lawmaking, this did not merely raise the spectre of faction, it 
was the thing itself - the co-optation of public power by self­
interested private groups. Third, and in a discussion of particular rele­
vance to the general subject here, the Court distinguished other stat­
utes, most notably the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") Act, partly 
by reference to the procedural safeguards provided by those statutes. 
"What are 'unfair methods of competition' are thus to be determined 
in particular instances, upon evidence, in the light of particular com­
petitive conditions and of what is found to be a specific and substantial 
public interest. To make this possible, Congress set up a special pro­
cedure."144 As we will see, the seeds of the new nondelegation doc­
trine can be found in this passage, insofar as procedures are under­
stood as a surrogate for clear congressional instructions.145 
In the decades since Schechter Poultry, however, nondelegation 
challenges have been routinely repudiated.146 Indeed, the Court has 
upheld some apparently extreme grants of authority to the executive 
branch.147 But there have been a few conflicting signals. In the most 
visible opinion, Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum 
Institute,148 better known as the Benzene Case, the basic question was 
whether the Occupational Safety and Health Act called for (a) cost­
benefit balancing (as urged in a concurrence by Justice Powell),149 (b) 
demonstration that any regulated risk be "significant" (as urged in the 
plurality opinion of four Justices, written by Justice Stevens), 150 or (c) 
agency action whenever there was any risk at all (as urged in a dis­
senting opinion of four Justices, written by Justice Marshall). 151 Both 
the plurality and Justice Rehnquist used the nondelegation doctrine, 
but ultimately they sent conflicting signals about the proper place of 
the doctrine. 
143. See id. at537. 
144. Id. at 533 (citations omitted). 
145. See infra Section V.A.1. 
146. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); United States v. South­
western Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Yakus 
v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
147. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-80; Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 167-78; 
Yakus, 321 U.S. at425-26. 
148. 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
149. See Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 664-71 (Powell, J., concurring). 
150. See id. at 614-15 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.). 
151. See id. at 690-91, 713-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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Then-Justice Rehnquist suggested that the Act should be struck 
down on nondelegation grounds.152 In his view, Congress had made no 
choice among the three alternatives.153 The statute was therefore an 
unconstitutional delegation. Justice Rehnquist contended that the 
statute was a kind of "mirage," in which Congress "simply avoid[ed] a 
choice which was both fundamental for purposes of the statute and yet 
politically so divisive that the necessary decision or compromise was 
difficult, if not impossible, to hammer out in the legislative forge."154 
Justice Stevens's plurality opinion referred to the nondelegation 
doctrine not to invalidate the Act but as a tool of statutory construc­
tion.155 In the plurality's view, the agency's position would allow it 
such massive power over the private sector as to create a possibly un­
constitutional delegation of power.156 Partly for this reason, the Court 
read the statute to require OSHA to show a "significant risk" before it 
could undertake regulation.157 For the plurality, then, the nondelega­
tion doctrine operated as a kind of clear statement principle, requiring 
Congress to speak unambiguously if it sought to give (what the Court 
saw as) open-ended authority to administrators.158 Note, however, 
that the Court left the definition of the key term - "significant risk" 
- to the agency, and that OSHA has yet to give a rule-like under­
standing of that highly ambiguous term.159 
In the immediate aftermath of the Benzene Case, there were occa­
sional lower court suggestions that the nondelegation doctrine was "no 
longer . . .  moribund."160 A handful of lower courts cases have now in­
voked the doctrine. Thus in Massieu v. Reno,161 a district court struck 
152 See id. at 684 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). 
153. See id. at 672. 
154. Id. at 681, 687 (specifically calling the feasibility requirement a "mirage"). 
155. See id. at 646. 
156. See id. 
157. See id. at 651. 
158. There is much reason to question the plurality's analysis. OSHA did not urge that 
it could do whatever it wanted; it did not say that the statute allowed it to regulate on what­
ever terms it chose. On the contrary, it said whenever there was an identifiable risk to 
workers, the statute required OSHA to regulate to the point where compliance was not fea­
sible. This is a severe, even draconian statute, not so different from the Delaney Clause, 
which barred any carcinogens in food color additives. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cos­
metic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 379e{b){5){B) {1994). But a draconian statute is not an open·ended 
delegation of authority. If Congress told EPA to eliminate any pollutant that causes any risk 
at all, EPA's discretion would be sharply constrained. Accord American Trucking Ass'ns v. 
EPA, Nos. 97-1440, 97-1441, 1999 WL 979463, at *9 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 29, 1999) {Silberman, J., 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en bane). 
159. See infra note 243. 
160. See, e.g., Fort Worth & Denver R.R. v. Lewis, 693 F.2d 432, 435 n.8 {5th Cir. 1982). 
161. 915 F. Supp. 681 {D.NJ. 1996). 
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down a provision of a federal deportation statute saying that "[a]n 
alien whose presence or activities in the United States the Secretary of 
State has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious 
adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States is deport­
able."162 On the court's view, this was an open-ended grant of power, 
because the notion of "potentially serious adverse foreign policy con­
sequences" could be construed in numerous different ways, thus rais­
ing a risk of arbitrariness. And in South Dakota v. Department of Inte­
rior, 163 a court of appeals invalidated the Indian Reorganization Act 
insofar as it authorized the Secretary of the Interior "in his discretion, 
to acquire . . .  any interest in lands . . .  within or without existing reser­
vations . . .  for the purpose of providing land for Indians."164 But these 
are extremely unusual cases, and because of the near abandonment of 
the nondelegation doctrine in federal law, it is unlikely that other 
courts would follow them, even on identical facts. 
B. What; If Anything, Is the Nondelegation Doctrine For? 
The opinions of Justice Rehnquist and the plurality in the Benzene 
Case have spurred renewed interest in the nondelegation doctrine, and 
many have argued for its revival.165 There has thus been a spirited de­
bate over what purposes such a revival would serve, and whether, in 
light of those purposes, a revival would be justified.166 
1. Nondelegation Values 
It is possible to isolate several possible nondelegation values. First 
and foremost, the doctrine is designed to promote a distinctive kind of 
accountability - the kind of accountability that comes from requiring 
specific decisions from a deliberative body reflecting the views of rep-
162 Massieu, 915 F. Supp. at 699 (quoting Immigration and Nationality Act § 
241(a)(4)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(C)(i) (1994) (current version at § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i))). 
163. 69 F.3d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
164. South Dakota, 69 F3d at 882 (quoting Indian Reorganization Act § 5, 25 U.S.C. § 
465). 
165. See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 130; Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: 
Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295 (1987). 
166. Leading discussions include DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, 
DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST PoLmCS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING 
UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND 
GOVERNANCE: USING PuBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PuBLIC LAW 131-57 (1997); 
SCHOENBROD, supra note 130; Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 
68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982); Symposium, The Phoenix Rises Again: The Nondelegation 
Doctrine from Constitutional and Policy Perspectives, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 731 (1999); 
Symposium, The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. 
REV. 277 (1987). 
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resentatives from various states of the union. This is hardly to say that 
the executive branch lacks accountability; of course the President is 
subject to the will of the people.167 But the nondelegation doctrine 
should be associated less with accountability in the abstract than with 
the particular constitutional goal of ensuring a deliberative democracy, 
one that involves not only accountability but also reflectiveness.168 
The vesting of lawmaking power in Congress is designed to ensure the 
combination of deliberation and accountability that comes from saying 
that government power cannot be brought to bear on individuals un­
less diverse representatives, from diverse places, have managed to 
agree on the details. Consider, as an extreme example, the early deci­
sion by the German legislature to confer on Adolf Hitler the power to 
rule by "decree"; this delegation made possible lawmaking exercises 
that would otherwise have been extremely cumbersome, and hence 
removed an important check on arbitrary rule.169 
A closely related point has to do with the extent to which law, and 
particularly national legislation, can amount to an infringement on lib­
erty. If no law may be brought to bear against the public unless di­
verse members of Congress have been able to agree on a particular 
form of words, then perhaps there is an important safeguard of free­
dom. The underlying idea is that people may not be subject to na­
tional legal constraints unless and until there has been specific legisla­
tive authorization for the constraints. This idea can in tum be 
associated with social contract theory, allowing people to maintain 
certain private law rights unless there has been explicit authorization 
for what would otherwise be a common law wrong.170 
167. As emphasized in MASHA w, supra note 166, at 145-48, 152-56. 
168. See JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON (1994). On deliberative 
democracy generally, see DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Bister ed., 1998) and JORGEN 
lIABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans., The MIT Press 1996) 
(1992). 
169. See CURRIE, supra note 131, at 125-26. 
170. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY 
POLICY 27-32 (4th ed. 1999). There is, however, a problem with this conception of freedom, 
a particular problem in the aftermath of the New Deal: Why should we think that the status 
quo embodies freedom, and that the new law at issue would threaten to abridge freedom? It 
is far from clear, for example, that the common law system for regulating pollution - itself a 
regulatory system, and anything but prepolitical - should be taken as an embodiment of 
liberty, and that a Clean Air Act is a liberty-threatening abridgement of that freedom. 
Compare this to the area of discrimination: Is a law forbidding discrimination on the basis of 
race, sex, or disability something that threatens liberty, such that it is crucial to obtain legis­
lative agreement on its details, lest liberty be threatened? Or might the discriminatory status 
quo be the real threat to freedom? Questions of this kind seem to me to raise serious doubts 
about the idea that a strictly enforced nondelegation doctrine would promote liberty, prop­
erly conceived. On the general topic of status quo neutrality, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE 
PARTIAL CoNSTITUTION (1993). 
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The nondelegation doctrine also promotes rule-of-law values. In­
deed, the doctrine can be understood as a kind of "backdoor" void­
for-vagueness doctrine, serving the same fundamental goals.171 It does 
this, first, by promoting planning by ordinary people subject to law, by 
giving them a sense of what is permitted and what is forbidden. It 
does this, second, by cabining the discretionary authority of enforce­
ment officials, who might otherwise act abusively or capriciously. In 
both of these ways the nondelegation doctrine might be seen as a safe­
guard against the Framers' core concerns - self-interested represen­
tation and factional power. These points can be collected with the 
suggestion that the nondelegation doctrine reflects the Constitution's 
commitment to dual-branch lawmaking - a commitment that cabins 
arbitrary power, and promotes deliberation as well as accountability, 
by ensuring that governmental authority can be exercised only when 
both the legislature and the executive have made a particular decision 
to that effect. 
2. Against the Nondelegation Doctrine 
A revival of the doctrine might be challenged on several grounds. 
A large concern is institutional, involving judicial competence rather 
than the doctrine on its merits.172 The difference between a permissi­
ble and impermissible delegation - between "legislative" and "execu­
tive" conduct - is one of degree, not one of kind. From what has 
been said thus far, it should be clear that the line does not depend on 
anything qualitative but on a quantitative issue, the precise amount of 
delegated discretion, and there is no simple metric to tell how much 
discretion is too much. It is for this reason that Justice Scalia, among 
others, has urged that the nondelegation doctrine is largely unenforce­
able by the federal judiciary, simply because it is not subject to princi­
pled judicial application.173 If understood in these terms, the doctrine 
might be taken as a judicially underenforced constitutional norm -
but a constitutional norm nonetheless. 
171. Similarly, the void-for-vagueness doctrine might be seen as a backdoor nondelega­
tion doctrine, requiring a legislature to speak with clarity. See Debra Livingston, Public Dis­
cretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 
97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 608-10 (1997). Both doctrines are also cousins of the plain meaning 
rule in statutory construction, see John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 
97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 719 (1997), and are also closely connected with the project of de­
mocracy-forcing mininlalism, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 27. 
172 See Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 324-
28 (1987). 
173. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice 
Scalia's skepticism about judicial implementation of the nondelegation doctrine fits very well 
with his skepticism about rule-free law. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATIER OF 
INTERPRETATION 5-15 (1997). 
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These are largely institutional points; other objections cut deeper 
against the doctrine. Sometimes Congress has good reasons to dele­
gate. It may lack relevant information, not only about pollutants like 
particulates and ozone, but about the social consequences of one or 
another approach to regulation. It may also be aware of the existence 
of rapidly changing circumstances, which may make any particular ap­
proach increasingly anachronistic. For a multimember body, there are 
serious problems in achieving closure on any particular course of ac­
tion, and the result can be to push law in the direction of incompletely 
specified abstractions.174 These points are independent of the phe­
nomenon of delegating to escape the political consequences of speci­
ficity, a phenomenon that undoubtedly plays a large role as well.175 
The last point - about escaping accountability - is often taken as 
a reason for invigorating the nondelegation doctrine in the name of 
accountability;176 but Jerry Mashaw has urged the opposite - that 
administrators should be making political decisions, precisely on 
grounds of accountability.177 As Mashaw notes, agencies are 
themselves politically accountable through their relationship to the 
President. Indeed, public choice theory may well suggest that 
Congress is more, not less, susceptible to factional power than 
bureaucrats acting under the arm of the President. There is evidence 
that factional power is most influential precisely when Congress 
legislates with particularity.178 In any case the issue cannot be resolved 
in the abstract. And it is hard to come up with any a priori reason why 
decisions by agencies would be worse, from the standpoint of 
promoting social well-being, than decisions by Congress. 
There is an empirical point here. It is not clear that from any point 
of view, things have gone systematically better when Congress is clear 
than when Congress is not.179 If we ask about promoting public wel-
174. See Aranson et al., supra note 166, at 21-27; Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann­
Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, 110 ETHICS 5 (1999); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL 
REASONING AND PoLmCAL CONFLICT (1996). See EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note 
166, at 230-31, for a general discussion suggesting, on the basis of a theoretical and empirical 
investigation, that delegations are in large part a product of lack of congressional informa­
tion. 
175. See Aranson et al., supra note 166, at 32-34, 57-62. 
176. See id. at 64-67; SCHOENBROD, supra note 130, at 171. 
177. See MASHAW, supra note 166, at 145-57; see also EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra 
note 166, at 10 ("Indeed, special interests may receive protection through favorable agency 
regulations, but is this more widespread or morally more opprobrious than having them pro­
tected through a tax loophole or a targeted provision in a bill?"). 
178. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAMT. HASSLER, CLEAN COAI.IDIRTY AIR 26-
58 (1986). 
179. See Stewart, supra note 172, at 331-34. Thus the most extensive empirical and 
theoretical treatment concludes that delegation is 
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fare, or about agency competence and fair-dealing, it appears unim­
portant to know whether Congress has spoken with clarity. The Inter­
state Commerce Commission, for example, was one of the least well­
respected agencies, and it operated under open-ended statutory terms; 
the Securities and Exchange Commission is highly regarded, though 
its organic statute is similarly open-ended. The Department of Agri­
culture is one of the least well-regarded agencies, and the statutes it 
administers are frequently all too clear. The Internal Revenue Service 
is highly regarded, at least by specialists, and many of the provisions 
that it must enforce are highly detailed. In short: There seems to be 
no link between clear statutory terms and agency competence or 
agency contribution to social well-being. 
3. The Centrality of Floors and Ceilings 
Thus it might be questioned whether a reinvigoration of the non­
delegation doctrine would be a sensible response to any of the prob­
lems and pathologies of the modern administrative state.180 Indeed it 
would be foolish to suggest that such a revival would ensure better 
regulatory policy, or even that it would mark a significant improve­
ment in terms of democratic values. There is no basis for a revival of 
the nondelegation doctrine. But the doctrine nonetheless deserves to 
play a continuing if modest role in the constitutional regime. 
Contrary to Mashaw's suggestion, administrators are often weakly 
accountable to the President (or the electorate), and in any case 
Congress has a distinctive kind of accountability, and it is that kind of 
accountability that leads to its place as the institution entrusted with 
the making of federal law. The Constitution would not tolerate a 
legislative grant of authority to the President to enact such 
environmental regulations as he deemed best, even though it is not 
clear that such a grant would lead to inferior environmental policies. 
The special form of political accountability anticipated by Article I, 
a necessary counterbalance to the concentration of power in the hands of committees. In an 
era where public policy becomes ever more complex, the only way for Congress to make all 
important policy decisions internally would be to concentrate significant amounts of author­
ity in the hands of powerful committee and subcommittee leaders, once again surrendering 
policy to a narrow subset of its members . . . . In our view, delegation is a self-regulating sys­
tem not in need of closer attention from the judiciary. 
EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note 166, at 237-38. The authors add that: 
As it now works, the system of delegation allows legislators to play committees off against 
agencies, dividing the labor across the branches so that no one set of actors dominates. 
Given this perspective, limits on delegation would not only be unnecessary, they would 
threaten the very individual liberties they purport to protect. 
Id. at 238. 
180. See Stewart, supra note 172, at 331-34. In the same spirit, see BREYER ET AL., 
supra note 170, at 27-32. 
340 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:303 
Section 1 does call for limitations on executive discretion. As we shall 
see, this requirement is best promoted not by invalidating legislation, 
but by statutory construction and by clear statement principles - the 
real place where contemporary American law recognizes a 
nondelegation doctrine, and where that doctrine now flourishes - and 
also by judicial invalidation in the extremely rare cases where even 
aggressive statutory construction is able to identify neither floors nor 
ceilings. 
IV. THE NEW NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE 
[E]ven with all its Frankenstein-like warts, knobs, and (concededly) 
dangers, the unconstitutional delegation doctrine is worth hewing from 
the ice. 
-Antonin Scalia181 
[I]n our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and 
more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an 
ability to delegate power under broad general directives. 
-Mistretta v. United States182 
In this Part, I discuss a set of developments in the modem law of 
"nondelegation." The story begins with an imaginative essay by 
Kenneth Culp Davis, offering a "new" nondelegation doctrine that 
would require agencies, not Congress, to come up with binding con­
straints on agency discretion. The story ends \vith a set of judicial de­
velopments that firmly embrace this idea, by requiring agencies to in­
terpret statutes in a way that sharply narrows agency discretion. To 
this date, American Trucking is the culmination of these develop­
ments. 
A. Kenneth Culp Davis's Interesting Innovation 
Beginning with an important essay in 1969,183 Kenneth Culp Davis 
proposed a new approach to the nondelegation doctrine. In its origi­
nal form, he claimed, the doctrine was dead, and quite properly so. 
Congress could not be expected to legislate specifically, and it should 
not be asked to do so. But much of the doctrine could be rescued, and 
could perform a salutary function, if agencies could be required to de­
velop protections against uncontrolled discretionary power, and to ad­
here to them. "The key should no longer be statutory words; it should 
be the protections the administrators in fact provide, irrespective of 
181. Antonin Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, REGULATION, July/Aug., 1980, at 25, 
28. 
182. 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
183. Davis, supra note 128. 
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what the statutes say or fail to say."184 Thus Davis urged "a much 
broader requirement, judicially enforced, that as far as is practicable 
administrators must structure their discretionary power through ap­
propriate safeguards and must confine and guide their discretionary 
power through standards, principles, and rules."185 Davis thus pro­
posed a shift from a requirement of statutory clarity to a requirement 
of administrative clarity. In Davis's view, a central problem for the 
regulatory state is excessive discretion - a system of "discretionary 
justice."186 The remedy would be to require administrators to limit 
their own room to maneuver. 
The consequence of this requirement would be that rule-of-law 
values would operate at the agency level. This would promote pre­
dictability and minimize the arbitrary exercise of power. Synthesizing 
a long period of work, Davis wrote that "[t]he basic purpose of the 
traditional non-delegation doctrine is unsatisfactory and should be 
changed. It should no longer be either to prevent delegation of legis­
lative power or to require meaningful statutory standards."187 In 
Davis' view, the 
crucial consideration is not what the statute says but what the administra­
tors do. The safeguards that count are the ones the administrators use, 
not the ones mentioned in the statute . . . . The alteration in the non­
delegation doctrine in this respect can be a rather small one: The courts 
should continue their requirement of meaningful standards, except that 
when the legislative body fails to prescribe the required standards for 
discretionary action in particular cases, the administrators should be al­
lowed to satisfy the requirement by prescribing them within a reasonable 
time.188 
Davis was not entirely clear about the legal source for this pro­
posed requirement. He did not say whether courts should act pursu­
ant to the Due Process Clause, Article I, the Administrative Proce­
dure Act189 ("APA"), or the common law. In a remarkably short 
treatment, he said that "[p ]er haps the non-delegation doctrine will 
gradually turn into a facet of due process . . . . But in the longer term, 
perhaps the constitutional base will give way to a common-law 
base."190 This was less than a decade before the Court's ruling in Ver-
184. Id. at 713. 
185. Id. 
186. See DA VIS, supra note 2, at 10-35. 
187. KENNEIH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 'TREATISE § 3:15, at 208 (2d ed. 
1978). 
188. Id. § 3:15, at 211. 
189. 5 u.s.c. § 706 (1994). 
190. Davis, supra note 128, at 733. 
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mont Yankee,191 the Erie Railroad of administrative procedure, that 
there is no common law of administrative law. Though Davis did not 
specify the source of his requirement, he clearly contemplated judicial 
enforcement of his innovation. 
B. The (Early) Life of an Idea 
It is not clear to what extent subsequent judicial developments 
were actually influenced by Davis's suggestion. But it is clear that in 
the 1970s, a number of cases required administrators to generate rules 
and criteria, and several such cases seemed to adopt an approach quite 
close to that proposed by Davis.192 
In a series of cases, courts held that an agency violated the Due 
Process Clause if it did not generate criteria by which to limit its own 
exercise of discretion. Thus, for example, courts held that liquor li­
censes could not be given out without publicly articulated criteria,193 
and that agencies were constitutionally obliged to say something about 
the grounds on which they would give out public housing.194 But by far 
the most prominent use of the idea came in Judge Leventhal's opinion 
in the celebrated case upholding the wage and price freeze statute, 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally.195 
The remarkably broad statutory provision at issue in that case 
authorized the President "to issue such orders and regulations as he 
may deem appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and salaries at 
levels not less than those prevailing on May 25, 1970."196 Thus 
Congress essentially gave no guidance to the President, at least not in 
the text of the statute. A key part of Judge Leventhal's response -
and a somewhat desperate one under the circumstances - was to 
suggest that there was a requirement that the executive develop 
"subsidiary" administrative law, and stick to it.197 In his words, a 
"feature that blunts the 'blank check' rhetoric is the requirement that 
any action taken by the Executive under the law, subsequent to the 
191. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Coun­
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
192 See, e.g., Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1982); Jensen v. Administrator of 
the FAA, 641 F.2d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 1981); Carey v. Quern, 588 F.2d 230, 232-34 (7th Cir. 
1978); White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 753-54 (7th Cir. 1976); Burke v. United States, 968 
F. Supp. 672, 680-81 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Martinez v. Ibarra, 759 F. Supp. 664, 668 (D. Colo. 
1991); Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134, 1139-40 (D.N.H. 1976). 
193. See Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964). 
194. See Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968). 
195. 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). 
196. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, § 202, 84 Stat. 799 (1970) 
(repealed 1982). 
197. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. at 759. 
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freeze, must be in accordance with further standards as developed by 
the Executive."198 This requirement was said to be "inherent in the 
Rule of Law and implicit in the Act."199 Thus Judge Leventhal 
emphasized the "requirement of subsidiary administrative policy, 
enabling Congress, the courts and the public to assess the Executive's 
adherence to the ultimate legislative standard . . . .  "200 In his view, 
"there is an on-going requirement of intelligible administrative policy 
that is corollary to and implementing of the legislature's ultimate 
standard and objective."201 
There are several points to notice about this opinion. For those 
steeped in regulatory policy - or from what might be called a more 
contemporary perspective - the major constraints on the President 
would come not from the idea of the Rule of Law but from the par­
ticular context and background.202 These suggested that the Act was a 
response to perceived "cost-push" inflation, that is, a situation in 
which wage demands and price increases had created a kind of infla­
tionary spiral, in which the anticipation of one would fuel an increase 
in the other. Whatever the merits of this understanding of the eco­
nomic situation, it suggests a real constraint on the President's author­
ity: He may not favor particular industries or particular workers, and 
all of his decisions must be made in terms of the underlying problem 
that Congress meant to solve. This point suggests a much broader 
one, to which I will return: An understanding of particular regulatory 
programs, and their public rationale, will often lead both courts and 
agencies to a narrower understanding of statutory terms, one that will 
sharply discipline agency discretion. We might understand this as a 
more modem approach to regulatory questions, one that diverts un­
derstanding from the traditional lawyerly concern with "discretion," 
writ large, and shifts the focus to a better understanding of regulatory 
policy.203 But Judge Leventhal did not take this approach. 
In a sense, the approach that Judge Leventhal chose has a com­
monality with Schechter Poultry itself, where, it will be recalled, the 
198. Id. at 758. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 759. 
201. Id. 
202. See STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
REGULATORY POLICY 109-12 (2d ed. 1985). 
203. This approach to administrative law is best associated with Justice Breyer. See 
BREYER, supra note 5; STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982). It sug­
gests a significant shift from the legal culture's preoccupation with the control of discretion, 
which is not the central problem for regulatory policy, toward a better understanding of 
regulatory substance. In the same vein, see Stewart, supra note 172, at 323-29. Cf. RICHARD 
A. POSNER, 'nm PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL 'niEORY 228-39 (1999) (empha­
sizing the need for administrative law to engage with regulatory policy). 
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Court pointed to procedural safeguards in the FTC Act as an impor­
tant distinguishing feature.204 Procedural guarantees can be seen as a 
check on arbitrary judgment, operating as a kind of (partial) surrogate 
for clear statutory standards. The requirement of subsidiary adminis­
trative law belongs in the same category - finding surrogate safe­
guards in anything that operates as a constraint on the uncontrolled 
discretion of the administrator. 
Notably, Judge Leventhal invoked the requirement of "subsidiary 
administrative law" to uphold a statute, not to invalidate agency ac­
tion. And in the two decades after Amalgamated Meat Cutters, the de­
cision was never understood to provide a tool by which troublesome 
delegations might be invalidated. Indeed, it can be understood as part 
of a range of surrogate safeguards, operating in Davis's spirit and 
promoting nondelegation goals without invoking the nondelegation 
doctrine.205 Thus much of the work of the doctrine, and of Davis's 
proposal, ultimately came from judicial review of agency action for ar­
bitrariness. Thus courts have required extremely detailed justifica­
tions for agency rules under the "hard look" doctrine and in particular 
they have required agencies to explain departures from past prac­
tices. 206 The result has been to require, on nonconstitutional grounds, 
at least some of what Davis proposed: clear articulation of agency 
policy choices, a defense of those choices, and a requirement of adher­
ence to those choices unless there was reason not to adhere to them. But 
as we will see, these requirements have been confounded, or proved 
inadequate, in some modem contexts; and because of their unantici­
pated systemic effects on agency rulemaking, they raise serious diffi­
culties of their own.207 
C. The Rise of the New Nondelegation Doctrine 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters came to enjoy a rebirth, and also to be 
understood differently, in an extremely important case, International 
204. See supra text accompanying notes 140-144. 
205. See Richard B. Stewart, The Interest-Representation Model of Administrative Law, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1699 n.144 {1975). 
206. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 40-44 
{1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 {1971); see also 
Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 525-62 
{1985); Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. 
PA. L. REV. 509, 511-15 (1974); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 
1983 SUP. Cr. REV. 177. Note the revisionist attack on the doctrine. See MASHAW, supra 
note 166; Pierce, supra note 83; Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judi­
cial Controls over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251 
{1992). 
207. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO 
SAFETY {1992). 
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Union v. OSHA.'21)8 The case involved a large-scale regulatory effort 
by OSHA to protect workers, with "lock-outs" and informational 
"tags," from the hazards of energy released from industrial machinery. 
To simplify a complex story, the regulation at issue required employ­
ers to place a "lock" on energy-isolating devices connected to the 
equipment; or, alternatively, if the equipment could not be locked or if 
another approach were equally effective, the employers were required 
to place a warning "tag" on the energy isolating device, saying that 
employees should not operate the device until the tag is removed.209 
The only governing statutory language was remarkably brief. It 
said that OSHA should issue regulations "reasonably necessary or ap­
propriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of em­
ployment."210 The first question was the meaning of this apparently 
open-ended statutory term. OSHA said that this language required it 
to regulate (a) any "significant risk" to (b) the point of "feasibility," 
that is, to the point where compliance would not be feasible for the in­
dustry, either technologically or economically.211 In this way, OSHA 
interpreted the "reasonably necessary or appropriate" language in a 
way quite similar to the plurality's interpretation of the statute insofar 
as it governed toxic substances in the Benzene Case.212 Notice that on 
the agency's interpretation, at least two ideas require a great deal of 
interpretive work. How do we know whether a risk is "significant" -
what are the ingredients of that inquiry? And how do we know 
whether an expenditure is "feasible"? Surely feasibility, like safety, is 
not an off-on switch. It is not as if at a certain, naturally identifiable 
point, an expenditure that had been feasible for industry is no longer 
so. 
But the lock-out/tag-out court did not press these points. Instead it 
said that as the agency had interpreted the statute, the agency had 
free-wheeling authority in individual cases to go from doing "nothing 
at all" to "requir[ing] precautions that take the industry to the verge of 
economic ruin . . . . "213 In the court's view, the statute, so interpreted, 
might well violate the nondelegation doctrine. Hence the court 
remanded the case to the agency in order to give it an opportunity to 
adopt an interpretation that would be both "reasonable and consistent 
with the nondelegation doctrine."214 The court, or at least Judge 
208. 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
209. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147 (1999). 
210. 29 u.s.c. § 652(8) (1994). 
211. See International Union, 938 F.2d at 1317. 
212. See supra text accompanying notes 148-159. 
213. International Union, 938 F.2d at 1317. 
214. Id. at 1313. 
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Williams, seemed to want the agency to use cost-benefit analysis as the 
basis for decision,215 but it did not require that approach. What is 
noteworthy here is that the court borrowed the Amalgamated Meat 
Cutters idea, requiring agencies to discipline their own discretion 
through "subsidiary administrative policy," so as to hold an agency 
construction invalid unless it sufficiently limits agency discretion. 
On remand, the agency added to its "significant risk" and "feasi­
bility" constraints three different points: (1) the standard must use the 
most cost-effective protective measures; (2) the agency must publish 
an explanation of why any standard differing from an existing national 
consensus standard would better promote the purposes of the Act; and 
(3) the agency must support its choice of standard with record evi­
dence and explain any inconsistency with prior agency practice.216 The 
agency added that when it identified any significant risk, it must pro­
vide "a high degree of worker protection," and would not be allowed 
to do "nothing at all."217 Thus the agency attempted to meet the 
court's challenge by suggesting that on any showing of evidence of 
harm, there were clear ceilings and floors to discipline agency discre­
tion. 
With evident ambivalence, the court concluded that this was suffi­
cient to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine.218 The court said that as 
construed by the agency, its statutory authority for regulation in gen­
eral would be quite close to its authority for toxic substances, which 
did not violate the nondelegation doctrine.219 In both cases, an agency 
must choose a "high degree of worker protection" once it finds a "sig­
nificant risk," and it could not regulate past the point of "feasibility." 
Even though these notions left a high degree of residual discretion, the 
agency was not given a blank check, and hence the statute was accept­
able as construed. The question left by the court's decision was 
whether its invocation of the nondelegation doctrine was a kind of 
sport, or whether it signaled a broader development in administrative 
law. 
215. See id. at 1326. This approach to OSHA differs from the American Trucking 
court's approach to the Clean Air Act, which found cost-benefit analysis precluded by the 
Act's explicit prohibition of cost considerations - BP A can consider only health benefits. 
See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038-40 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
216. See International Union v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing Control 
of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout!fagout), 58 Fed. Reg. 16,612, 16,614 (1993)). 
217. 37 F.3d at 669 (quoting58 Fed. Reg. at 16,615). 
218. See id. 
219. See id. 
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EP A's regulations involving particulates and ozone were chal­
lenged in American Trucking on a wide variety of grounds.220 The 
most ambitious of the challenges, based on Amalgamate,d Meat Cutters 
and International Union, was a claim that EP A's construction of the 
Act resulted in an unconstitutional delegation of power. In a remark­
able decision, the court of appeals agreed.221 
The court's analysis was similar to that in International Union. As 
the court noted, "the only concentration for ozone and PM that is ut­
terly risk-free, in the sense of direct health impacts, is zero."222 The 
problem was therefore that EPA lacks "any determinate criterion for 
drawing lines. It has failed to state intelligibly how much is too 
much."223 To be sure, EPA pointed to some relevant considerations: 
the nature and severity of the adverse health effects, the size of the 
sensitive population at risk, and the degree of uncertainties involved. 
The court thought it perfectly sensible to point to these considerations. 
The problem is that they "do not themselves speak to the issue of de­
gree."224 On the court's view, "EPA's formulation of its policy judg­
ment leaves it free to pick any point between zero and a hair below 
the concentrations yielding London's Killer Fog."225 
With respect to ozone, EPA defended its shift from the existing 
level of 0.09 to 0.08 on the ground that more people are exposed to 
more serious effects at 0.09 than at 0.08.226 But a shift to 0.07 would be 
still more effective in decreasing exposure levels, and "EPA never 
contradicts the intuitive proposition, confirmed by data in its Staff Pa­
per, that reducing the standard to that level would bring about compa­
rable changes."227 Hence EPA's rationale pointed to no disciplining 
criteria. To be sure, EPA said that a reduction to 0.07 would produce 
more transient and reversible effects, and the more serious effects 
would be less certain at that level. But this "seems to be nothing more 
220. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per cu­
riam). In fact the court accepted many of these challenges. It held, for example, that EPA 
could not enforce its ozone standards, and that the ozone standard was arbitrary because the 
agency had not adequately justified its refusal to consider the health benefits of ground-level 
ozone, which, it is claimed, helps prevent cancer and cataracts. See id. at 1051-53. 
221. See id. at 1034-40. 
222 Id. at 1034. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 1035. 
225. Id. at 1037. 
226. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 
38,867-68 (1997) (discussed in American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1035). 
227. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1035. 
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than a statement that lower exposure levels are associated with lower 
risk to public health. "228 The fact that EPA finds less severe and more 
speculative effects at lower levels shows only that "the agency rightly 
recognizes that the question is one of degree, but offers no intelligible 
principle by which to identify a stopping point."229 
In the most ambitious part of the opinion, the court said that in or­
der for EPA to make rational decisions, it might be necessary to "as­
sign weights" to a "range of ailments short of death . . . .  "230 The court 
referred with some approval to apparent decisions suggesting "some 
readiness to adopt standards that leave non-zero residual risk," as, for 
example, by using clinical criteria to decide what counts "as an adverse 
health effect." And likelihood judgments might draw "from other ar­
eas of the law, such as the familiar 'more probable than not' crite­
rion."231 The court emphasized that "a one-size-fits-all criterion of 
probability would make little sense." Thus, 
all the relevant variables seem to range continuously from high to low: 
the possible effects of pollutants vary from deaths to trivialities, and the 
size of the affected population, the probability of an effect, and the asso­
ciated uncertainty range from 'large' numbers of persons with point es­
timates of high probability, to small numbers and vague ranges of prob­
ability.232 
The court added: "Nonetheless, an agency wielding the power 
over American life possessed by EPA should be capable of developing 
the rough equivalent of a generic unit of harm that takes into account 
population affected, severity and probability."233 The court referred in 
this regard to the approach used by Oregon in devising a health plan 
for poor people. Oregon has used the notion of "quality-adjusted life 
years" to assess health gains, and a similar approach might be used to 
assess health risks. Hence the court held that the regulations, as justi­
fied, were unlawful. But it left undecided the question whether they 
should be vacated, an issue addressed below.234 
American Trucking creates a genuinely new nondelegation doc­
trine. The new doctrine requires agencies to discipline their own dis­
cretion through statutory interpretation. The basic idea is that agen­
cies must, on pain of constitutional invalidity, generate "floors" and 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 1036-37. 
230. Id. at 1039. 
231. Id. at 1038. 
232 Id. at 1039. 
233. Id. 
234. Note that other grounds were invoked in the case. See supra note 220. See also the 
discussion of health-health tradeoffs below in Section VI.B.5. 
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"ceilings" to limit their own power; and the space between floors and 
ceilings must not be too great. The implications of this new idea are 
quite broad. The new doctrine could well be applied not only to EPA 
decisions under the Clean Air Act, but to all EPA decisions, as well as 
decisions from OSHA, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal 
Communication Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commis­
sion, and many more. At the same time, the court did not decide 
whether to vacate the regulations, a topic that I take up below. 
V. EVALUATING THE NEW NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE 
Hard work will be needed to devise and secure the adoption of reconsti­
tutive solutions to the central overload and political irresponsibility gen­
erated by our prevailing reliance on command law. The energies of aca­
demic lawyers . . . should be centered on this task, not on supposed 
constitutional solutions that, in the end, can solve nothing. 
-Richard Stewart235 
[T]he nondelegation doctrine should be applied only as a second, per­
haps last, resort. Initial consideration should be given to reading the 
statutory authority of the agencies and the President more narrowly if 
the language permits. 
-Ernest Gellhom236 
A. Is This a Nondelegation Doctrine at All? 
1. The Appeal of the New Doctrine: Surrogate Safeguards 
The new nondelegation doctrine has unquestionable appeal, and, 
in one respect, it has long historic roots. To see why this is so, con­
sider the posture of a court presented with a statute that may or may 
not amount to an unconstitutional delegation. If the statute contains 
open-ended terms, but also requires agencies to act only after fulfilling 
elaborate procedural requirements, the nondelegation concern ap­
pears to be diminished. As emphasized in Schechter Poultry, the pro­
cedures serve as surrogate safeguards. 
To be sure, procedural rights do not ensure that Congress will 
make the fundamental value judgments; in this sense they do not pro­
mote the key purpose of the doctrine. But if the nondelegation doc­
trine is designed to promote rights of participation and accountability, 
then a right to be heard, and to receive a public response to what is 
said, can serve some of the goals of the doctrine. As we have seen, 
this was part of the rationale on which the Court said, in Schechter 
235. Stewart, supra note 172, at 343. 
236. Gellhom, supra note 132, at 352. 
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Poultry, that the Federal Radio Act and the Federal Trade Commis­
sion Act were unobjectionable, despite their apparently broad 
terms.237 
It is not a terribly long step from this idea - of procedures as sur­
rogate safeguards - to the notion that if administrators discipline 
their own discretion through requirements laid down in advance, an 
otherwise troubling delegation might be upheld - Judge Leventhal's 
suggestion in Amalgamated Meat Cutters. While constrained adminis­
trative discretion does not mean congressional lawmaking, it does tend 
to promote predictability, consistency, and visibility in law, and to en­
sure against ad hoc discretion by administrators, discretion that might 
be exercised arbitrarily. This is the sense in which Amalgamated Meat 
Cutters can be seen as of a piece with Schechter Poultry - with proce­
dures and agency self-constraint operating, in the former case, as a 
kind of "shield" against nondelegation doctrine attack. 
The innovation in International Union and American Trucking is to 
treat the notion of agency self-constraint not as a shield but as a sword 
- to suggest that if an agency has not engaged in self-binding via 
clear, articulable standards, the nondelegation doctrine has been vio­
lated. An approach of this kind might well increase the consistency 
and intelligibility of administrative policy, and it might make agency 
decisions more reflective and even on balance better. As a matter of 
policy analysis, American Trucking is quite sophisticated, and as we 
will see, there is a great deal to be said for encouraging EPA to at­
tempt more refined and (to the extent possible) quantitative assess­
ments of severity of effects, likelihood of effects, and size of popula­
tion exposed.238 Such an approach could well help in the development 
of "floors" and "ceilings" for EPA judgment, and an understanding of 
what counts as the legitimate "strike zone" could be a substantial im­
provement in regulatory law. 
2. Problems 
There are, however, serious problems here. Taken together, these 
problems amount to decisive objections to the new nondelegation doc­
trine. 
(a) Administrative rather than legislative lawmaking. If a statute 
creates a genuine nondelegation problem, why would an administra­
tive construction eliminate it? The fundamental point of the nondele­
gation doctrine is to ensure legislative rather than administrative 
judgments about the content of federal law. It is odd to say that a 
237. See supra Section III.A. 
238. See infra Section VI.A. 
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statute violates the nondelegation doctrine because of how it has been 
construed by the relevant agency. It is one thing for a court, eager not 
to overstep its constitutional role, to rescue a statute from nondelega­
tion attack by saying that the agency has construed the statute in such 
a way as to reduce risks of arbitrary judgment. It is another thing for a 
court to invalidate a statute on nondelegation grounds with the 
thought that the agency has failed to construe the statute with suffi­
cient clarity. This idea converts the nondelegation doctrine into some­
thing else altogether - a general requirement of administrative trans­
parency, a requirement with no obvious constitutional foundation, and 
certainly without foundation in Article I, the source of the nondelega­
tion doctrine. 
(b) Reinterpretation and discretion. Perhaps the American 
Trucking court's answer is that an agency interpretation can confine 
administrative discretion, and in that way, at least, promote some of 
the purposes of the nondelegation doctrine, rooted in rule-of-law 
values, including transparency. But there is oddity here too. Under 
Chevron,239 agencies are permitted to construe ambiguous statutory 
terms, and no agency interpretation is set in stone. Suppose that in 
International Union - the lock-out/tag-out case - a future OSHA 
accepted the court's explicit invitation and decided that cost-benefit 
analysis would be the basis for regulatory judgments. Would this be 
unlawful? Surely not.240 And if not - if the agency is entitled to 
reinterpret the statute in its (reasoned) discretion - then how, 
exactly, does one agency construction avoid a nondelegation problem? 
Perhaps it does so because any agency construction makes the ba­
sis for regulation visible to all, and in such a way as to constrain agency 
choice unless and until a new interpretation has been issued publicly 
and through the required channels. But this seems to be a pale echo 
of the nondelegation principle. It is a pale echo, first, because it im­
poses no requirements on Congress. It is a pale echo, second, because 
it does not bar agencies, over time, from construing open-ended statu­
tory terms in radically different ways.241 
239. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
240. This is because the OSHA statute would permit this interpretation. See Occupa­
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1994). 
241. In response to the petition for rehearing en bane, the court of appeals said that 
Chevron had superceded the Benzene Case, meaning that the proper response to a nondele­
gation challenge is to obtain a narrow administrative interpretation of the statute. See 
American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, Nos. 97-1440, 97-1441, 1999 WL 979463, at *2 (D.C. Cir. 
Oct. 29, 1999). The argument is ingenious but not responsive. If the statute is susceptible to 
a narrowing construction, the agency should certainly provide that construction, and under 
Chevron it is entitled to do so; but if it has not, this is the court's job, so as to save the stat­
ute's validity if this is fairly possible. 
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(c) Institutional difficulties and very slippery slopes. There is also a 
serious problem for the judicial role. Judge Leventhal used Davis' 
idea as a basis for upholding a consensual arrangement between 
Congress and the executive branch; the effort was to find a way to 
validate the statute while also giving a signal to the executive. The 
notion that open-ended statutes become unconstitutional unless 
accompanied by agency specification would entail a far larger judicial 
role. Indeed, that role would extend far beyond the setting of 
regulations of particulates and ozone. Consider the following: 
• It  would raise serious constitutional doubts about most and per­
haps all of the rest of EP A's national primary and secondary 
standards. None of those standards was issued with a clear 
statement of the criteria that would mark the line between per­
mitted and prohibited exposure levels. 
• It  could well raise questions about the activities of other agencies, 
such as the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), that 
operate pursuant to vague statutory terms; note that the FCC is 
permitted to give out licenses in accordance with "public interest, 
convenience, and necessity."242 What must the FCC say in order 
to discipline the exercise of its own authority? 
•It would raise constitutional questions about OSHA's use of the 
"significant risk" idea. We have seen that in the Benzene Case, 
the Court said that OSHA must show that any risk that it seeks to 
regulate qualifies as "significant." No one seems to think that se­
rious delegation issues are raised by the existence of administra­
tive discretion to decide when a risk so qualifies, notwithstanding 
the Supreme Court plurality's anticipation that this judgment 
would be made administratively. But plainly it would not suffice 
for an agency simply to announce that it deems a certain risk to 
be significant. How can an agency distinguish between significant 
and insignificant risks? Lower courts and OSHA have given 
some guidance, but not a great deal; under the American Truck­
ing ruling, this lack of statutory guidance raises serious constitu­
tional problems unless agencies discipline their own discretion.243 
242. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1994). 
243. The Benzene plurality's answer was a mix of the procedural and the substantive. 
On the procedural side, there is a duty of reason-giving; the agency must explain in an 
understandable way why it deems a certain risk significant. See Industrial Union Dep't v. 
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980). With respect to substance, the plurality 
made a distinction: "[I]f the odds are one in a thousand that regular inhalation of gasoline 
vapors that are 2% benzene will be fatal, a reasonable person might well consider the risk 
significant and take appropriate steps to decrease or eliminate it." Id. at 655. At the same 
time, the plurality said that a risk of one in a billion, from drinking a glass of water, could not 
reasonably be considered significant. 
Apart from recognizing the fact that judgments of significance will turn on "policy con­
siderations," subsequent developments in the lower courts and in OSHA have left a high 
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e It would raise serious constitutional problems about statutes that 
require agencies to engage in cost-benefit balancing, because 
those statutes typically do not contain anything like an accompa­
nying theory of valuation. Two especially prominent statutes -
the Toxic Substances Control Act244 and the Federal Insecticide, 
degree of vagueness. To the extent that quantitative judgments have been made, they take 
the form of a "strike zone" within which the agency can operate - a domain that marks out 
floors and ceilings. For example, OSHA believes that a working lifetime risk of death of 
over 1.64/1,900 from occupational causes is "significant." See Building & Constrs. Trades 
Dep't v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1988). This means that if a worker faces a 
1.64/1,000 risk of death if he is exposed, for all of his working life, to gasoline vapors that are 
2% benzene, that worker is facing a significant risk. The agency has expressly concluded 
that the significant risk standard is satisfied by a risk of 1.64 excess mesothelioma deaths per 
thousand. See id. at 1265. At the same time, the agency has said that a risk of 0.6 in 100,000 
"may be approaching a level that can be viewed as safe," Occupational Exposure to Formal­
dehyde, 52 Fed. Reg. 46, 168, 46,234 (1987), a qualified statement that, in context, suggests 
that a risk of 6 in one million would not be regarded as significant. Conclusions of this kind 
are certainly better than nothing at all, but they leave many open questions. What if the 
relevant risk involving injuries and illnesses rather than fatalities, or some combination of 
injuries, illnesses, and fatalities? Some version of the "quality-adjusted life years" idea 
would seem necessary to allow meaningful comparison of, say, a risk of 1/10,000 of death 
alongside a risk of 1/500 of serious respiratory problems. 
In addition, OSHA seems to consider the risk for workers subject to lifetime exposure, a 
number that seems vulnerable for two reasons. First, there are cases where lifetime expo­
sure is rare; what if, say, only 10% of the exposed population is exposed for all of a working 
life, and 50% is exposed for a period of ten years or less? Shouldn't this be taken into ac­
count in considering the significance of the risk? Second and more fundamentally: The size 
of the exposed population would seem to matter. See HAMILTON & V1scus1, supra note 63, 
at 91-108. Suppose, for example, that the relevant risk is 1/1,000, but that only 500 people 
are exposed to the risk; is this the same case, in terms of significance, as one in which the 
relevant risk is 1/1,000, and 2 million workers are exposed to the risk? Perhaps it is; perhaps 
the agency believes that no one should be exposed to a 1/1,000 risk of death. This is not an 
entirely implausible judgment. Even so, what if the risk is 6 in one million, but twenty mil­
lion workers are in the exposed population? By hypothesis, 120 workers will die as a result 
of the hazard. Is this so clearly insignificant? 
The point can be made more vividly by revisiting the Supreme Court's suggestion that a 
one in one billion risk of death from having a risk of chlorinated water "clearly could not be 
considered significant." Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 655. Suppose that every American 
drinks five glasses of water a day; suppose, too, that there are 250 million Americans. If 
Americans drink 1.25 billion glasses of water each day, then 1.25 Americans will contract a 
fatal illness each day, which is to say that 456 Americans will contract a fatal illness each year 
from drinking water. Is it so clear that the relevant risk is insignificant? Or that a govern­
ment agency is disabled from reaching that conclusion? A possible reaction to these prob­
lems is that it is extremely artificial to assess the significance of a risk without also assessing 
the cost of eliminating it. If the chlorinated water risk just discussed could be eliminated at a 
cost of $10,000, it should by all means be eliminated; things are different if the cost would 
run to many billions of dollars. But as construed by the court, OSHA forbids cost-benefit 
balancing. Hence the agency must make a risk-only determination. We can imagine a range 
of sensible judgments - for example, from 1/1,000 as a presumptively significant risk to 
1/100,000 as a presumptively insignificant risk (both rebuttable depending on the size of the 
population); or an approach based on quality-adjusted life years ("QAL Y s") - for example, 
considering a savings of over 50 QAL Y s per year a presumptively sufficient basis for regula­
tion. See infra Section VI.A.4 for a discussion of QAL Y s. 
244. 15 u.s.c. § 2601-2692. 
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Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act245 - require the agency to regu­
late "unreasonable risks," a term that clearly contemplates some 
form of cost-benefit balancing. All such statutes raise obvious 
questions. Should a life be valued at $500,000 or $10 million? 
What about a respiratory illness? And what is the appropriate 
discount rate for lives saved and illnesses averted (say) twenty 
years from now?246 Congress has made no effort to answer these 
questions.247 Are such measures unconstitutional unless and until 
the agency has come up with a consistent method of valuation? 
Some observers have suggested that cost-benefit balancing would 
be a way to avoid the constitutional problems recognized in 
American Trucking.248 But under the logic of the case, a cost­
benefit requirement unaccompanied by some kind of quantifica­
tion would be unconstitutional unless and until an agency disci­
plines itself with clear valuation criteria. This would be an ex­
travagant conclusion. 
• It would raise questions about much other BP A activity as well. 
Consider the statute governing the calculation of natural resource 
damages, where Congress simply refers to factors that BP A must 
consider, without making them exclusive or giving them a speci­
fied weight.249 Is this statute therefore unconstitutional? Until 
the agency has undertaken the job of weighting? 
245. 7 u.s.c. § l36-136y. 
246. On the centrality of this question, see Heinzerling, supra note 8, at 2017-2024, and 
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of 
Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 943-47 {1999). 
247. Legislative silence raises many questions. One is positive: Why has Congress ef­
fectively delegated the central issues to the executive branch? Part of the answer lies in the 
incentives faced by individual legislators. See EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note 166, at 
196-206; Aranson et al., supra note 166, at 43-45. For a member of Congress, an insistence 
on cost-benefit analysis is likely to please relevant constituencies concerned about excessive 
or irrational legislation. But a judgment about valuation - suggesting, for example, that a 
statistical life is worth $2 million - is likely to be exceedingly controversial, a kind of recipe 
for campaign advertisements by political opponents. In most cases, individual members 
have far more to lose than to gain from specificity. But this is only part of the explanation. 
In a sense, people engage in cost-benefit analysis all the time; they decide whether to pur­
chase a Volvo, or to have a smoke alarm, or to live in the city, or to walk across the street at 
night. But ordinary people are highly resistant to explicit cost-benefit analysis; they do not 
believe, for example, that they are assigning a price to their child's (statistical?) life when 
they decide whether to put their child in the backseat of the car. There is a kind of moral 
taboo against explicit cost-benefit analysis, at least with respect to people's lives. The moral 
taboo may be a form of irrationality; or it may be a kind of overgeneralization of othenvise 
sound (or at least salutary) moral intuitions. In any case it should not be surprising to find 
that law is based on those moral intuitions. Very predictably, elected officials will sometimes 
require cost-benefit balancing, but they will leave questions of valuation to bureaucrats. 
248. See, e.g., Lutter & DeMuth, supra note 8, at 3. 
249. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2) (1994). 
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( d) Alternatives. Perhaps it would be necessary to consider radical 
steps if there were no alternative to the new nondelegation doctrine. 
But ordinary judicial review, suitably adapted to this context, offers 
some promising approaches, as we will soon see. And in the extreme 
cases, the old nondelegation doctrine would be the best route to fol­
low. In fact International Union was the strongest case within memory 
for judicial invalidation of a statute on nondelegation grounds. The 
"reasonably necessary or appropriate" language offered almost no 
guidance at all, and unlike in Amalgamated Meat Cutters, there was, in 
the statute's background, no context that could have disciplined the 
discretion of the agency. If the court had sought to avoid constitu­
tional doubts, International Union might have been the occasion, not 
for an invitation to the agency to choose an interpretation of its liking, 
but for an authoritative judicial interpretation requiring OSHA to en­
gage in cost-benefit balancing. The court might have so concluded on 
the ground that "reasonably necessary or appropriate" is far more of a 
balancing provision than the more specific toxic substance provision, 
and on the further ground that an interpretation to this effect would 
have had the advantage of preventing the agency from having the dis­
cretion to choose from one of a large number of interpretations of the 
Act. Certainly this approach seems preferable to a remand to the 
agency on nondelegation grounds. And as we will see, judicial efforts 
to require quantification - express identification of risk levels - and 
to elicit relevant value judgments could accomplish most of the goals 
of the new nondelegation doctrine without bringing out constitutional 
artillery at all. 
Indeed there is a large puzzle at the heart of American Trucking: 
Why didn't the court simply construe the Act so as to create floors and 
ceilings, and then hold that BP A's decision was not adequately justi­
fied, and therefore must be remanded, because of the failure to ex­
plain why one level rather than another had been chosen? The most 
plausible answer is that the court sought not simply to invalidate an 
inadequately explained regulation, but to send the agency a stronger 
and more global signal, to the effect that any regulation must be de­
fended, on pain of constitutional invalidity, by reference to a close, 
quantitative explanation of why it is superior to the alternative. But as 
a constitutional doctrine, this seems implausible. Congress frequently 
asks agencies to consider a set of factors.250 Is agency action pursuant 
250. See, e.g., Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, § 
4(b)(l), '01 Stat. 627, 629-30 (1973) (omitted pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 760(g) (1994)) (empha­
sizing that "to the maximum extent practicable," the agency should "provide for" no fewer 
than eight factors, including protection of public health, economic efficiency, maintenance of 
exploration and production of fuels, equitable distribution of crude oil and petroleum prod­
ucts, and many more). (The statute is discussed as typical in KENNETH CULP DAVIS & 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6 (3d ed. 1994).) See also, 
e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
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to such statutes violative of the Constitution until the agency has 
turned the factors into something like a rule? That would be an im­
plausible conclusion. 
B. The Place of the Nondelegation Doctrine in Administrative Law 
None of this means that the nondelegation doctrine deserves no 
place in administrative law. Indeed, some of the arguments thus far 
suggest a far from trivial role for the doctrine. 
1. Invalidations in Extreme Cases 
In the most extreme cases, open-ended grants of authority should 
be invalidated. Schechter Poultry was rightly decided, for the statute 
did not discipline executive authority, and indeed it operated as a 
grant of lawmaking power to private groups. And it would not have 
been at all implausible to conclude, in International Union, that if 
Congress is asking a regulatory agency to reduce occupational risks, it 
should say something other than that standards should be "reasonably 
necessary or appropriate" to promote statutory goals. In fact the 
OSHA statute - outside of the area of toxic substances, where Con­
gress added relevant detail251 - was a good candidate for invalidation 
on nondelegation grounds. 
A Supreme Court decision to this effect could have some of the 
salutary effects of the Lopez252 decision in the Commerce Clause area, 
offering a signal to Congress that it is important to think with some 
particularity about the standards governing agency behavior. There 
should not be many such cases; but an occasional signal is highly desir­
able. It follows that if the Clean Air Act did indeed authorize EPA to 
"pick any point between zero and a hair below . . .  London's Killer 
Fog," the Court would have been right to say that it was invalid. The 
problem was that this was an implausible construction of the Act.253 
("CERCLA") of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(4)(A)-(G) (1994) (listing seven factors as basis 
for presidential assessment of whether to provide a covenant not to sue); 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c) 
(providing, as guidelines for regulations determining natural resource damages, that the 
President should "identify the best available procedures • • .  and shall take into consideration 
factors including, but not limited to, replacement value, use value, and ability of the ecosys­
tem to recover"). 
251. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1994) (re­
ferring, inter alia, to requirement that regulations must be "feasible"). 
252. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
253. See infra Section V.C. 
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2. Statutory Construction 
In other cases, the nondelegation doctrine is an appropriate tool of 
construction: As between an open-ended and less open-ended under­
standing of agency authority, the less open-ended interpretation 
should be preferred. The most famous example is Kent v. Dulles,254 
where the Court narrowed a seemingly broad grant of authority to the 
Secretary of State, thus forbidding him to refuse a passport to a mem­
ber of the Communist Party. As we will shortly see, the nondelegation 
doctrine is part of what justifies a narrowing construction of the Clean 
Air Act, one that gives the agency limited room to maneuver.255 
Indeed, many statutes are sensibly construed to limit agency dis­
cretion, even if their terms are broad, when the context reasonably 
suggests that the agency is not permitted to do whatever it wishes. 
Consider, for example, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters case. As I have 
suggested, the best approach there would have involved a recognition 
that the statute was designed to meet the perceived problem of "cost­
push" inflation. Congress hardly meant to give the President the 
authority to set wages and prices however he chose. This would be a 
truly bizarre reading of the statute, taken in context.256 The President 
should be required to justify any wage and price freezes in statutorily 
relevant terms, a requirement that should go a long way toward allevi­
ating the underlying concerns, which had to do with political favorit­
ism. This is the conventional approach to the Federal Trade Commis­
sion Act257 (banning unfair trade practices258) and (with a little more 
difficulty) to the Federal Communications Act,259 whose key terms 
("public interest, convenience, and necessity") are not understood to 
allow the FCC to give and deny licenses on whatever terms it likes.260 
3. Democracy-Promoting Minimalism: Clear Statement Principles as 
Nondelegation Canons 
Perhaps most important, the nondelegation doctrine is alive and 
well, but it operates under another name: "clear statement" princi-
254. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). 
255. See infra Section V.C. 
256. Compare the delegation to Hitler; this was a genuine effort to allow Hitler to rule 
in his discretion. See CURRIE, supra note 131, at 125-27. 
257. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). 
258. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 532 (1935). 
259. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 312 (1994). 
260. See, e.g., Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Central 
Florida Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
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pies, or what we might understand as "nondelegation canons," occu­
pying the contemporary position of the old nondelegation doctrine.261 
Often courts say that statutes will not be interpreted to allow agen­
cies to engage in certain conduct unless there has been a clear state­
ment of authorization from Congress. For example, it seems to be 
clear that agencies cannot apply statutes extraterritorially without an 
express legislative decision to that effect, and courts will not under­
stand statutes to raise serious constitutional questions until Congress 
has made clear its intention to do so; so too, statutes are not lightly 
taken to preempt state law.262 These ideas are best understood as nar­
rower and more targeted versions of the nondelegation doctrine. Un­
like the standard version of that doctrine, they do not say that Con­
gress must legislate clearly; they do not result in the invalidation of 
any statute. But they do say that agencies will not be able to move 
statutes in certain contested directions on their own. Only a deliber­
ate and specific decision from the national legislature will suffice. By 
requiring Congress to legislate with particularity on certain topics, 
clear statement principles serve the same function as the nondelega­
tion doctrine. And they do so with respect to subjects that particularly 
seem to call for legislative rather than executive judgments. 
There is a further point. The nondelegation canons require 
congressional lawmaking, and in that sense they are connect�d with 
Article I goals, but they pose far less serious risks than the old 
doctrine. Where the old doctrine runs into serious institutional 
problems, partly because of the difficulty of drawing principled lines 
between too much and too little delegation, the nondelegation canons 
are quite simple to apply. Because these canons do not require courts 
to decide har.d questions of degree, and apply in a restricted domain, 
they impose far less strain on the judicial role. And where the old 
doctrine might be criticized as a potential source of danger to the 
fabric of national institutions (by, for example, drawing too many 
statutes into constitutional doubt), the nondelegation canons pose no 
such risk. They do not require general clarity from Congress; they 
mean only that where sensitive rights or interests are involved, 
Congress, rather than agencies, must make the central choices. 
It is especially striking that these "little" nondelegation principles 
trump agency interpretations of law, even in the post-Chevron era, in 
which agencies receive a high degree of law-interpreting power.263 
261. See generally Sunstein, supra note 23. 
262 See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (extraterritoriality); 
Muscogee Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (construction in favor of Native 
Americans); see also WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
323-28 (1994) (citing numerous canons of statutory construction). 
263. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 923 (1995) (refusing to defer to agency 
interpretation because of constitutional doubts); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf 
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Agency interpretations of ambiguous provisions do not prevail in the 
face of a clear statement principle, whose point is to ensure congres­
sional rather than merely executive deliberation on the question at 
hand. Thus understood, the clear statement principles are a paradig­
matic form of "democracy-promoting minimalism." They reflect a 
cautious judicial role, one that does not preempt democratic processes 
but instead attempts to fortify them, by ensuring that certain sensitive 
questions receive explicit and sustained attention from the national 
legislature. 
C. Why the Clean Air Act Is Constitutional (and What It Means) 
All this helps identify the basic question that must be answered in 
order to decide whether the Clean Air Act is constitutional: Does the 
Act authorize EPA to set standards at whatever level it wishes? Or 
does it set ceilings and floors? If ceilings and floors are in place, and if 
there is not too much room between them, then agency discretion is 
sufficiently constrained. 
In answering this question, courts appropriately do whatever might 
reasonably be done to avoid invalidating the Act - a natural applica­
tion of the general idea that whenever possible, statutes should be 
construed so as to be constitutional.264 The central issue is therefore 
one of statutory construction. In fact it is entirely possible to generate 
an interpretation of the statute that survives constitutional scrutiny. 
The most reasonable interpretation is that EP A's health-based judg­
ment (a) cannot call for regulation of small or trivial risks (such regu­
lation would not be "requisite to protect the public health"), and (b) 
must call for regulation of risks that are serious and substantial. Thus 
if the residual risk of a pollutant is trivial or de minimis - if, for ex­
ample, the risk involves minor respiratory problems but no more than 
that - then EPA is not obligated or even permitted to regulate it. In­
deed, EPA regulation of a trivial or de minimis risk should be held 
unlawful, on the ground that such regulation is not requisite to protect 
the public health, even with an adequate margin of safety. If EPA 
seeks to reduce exposure to ground-level ozone below a level that al­
ready ensures protection against all serious risks faced by Americans, 
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575-76 (1988) (same); Williams v. 
Babbitt, 115 F3d 657, 661 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); Boston and Me. Corp. v. ICC, 911 F.2d 743 
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (same). 
264. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958). For a similar sentiment from 
an enthusiast for the nondelegation doctrine, see Gellhorn, supra note 132, at 352 ("[T]he 
nondelegation doctrine should be applied only as a second, perhaps last, resort. Initial 
consideration should be given to reading the statutory authority of the agencies and the 
President more narrowly if the language permits."). 
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it is acting unlawfully.265 On the other hand, EPA is required (not 
merely permitted) to regulate any substantial or significant risk. If, for 
example, 10,000 people or 1,000 are likely to die each year as a result 
of exposure to a certain level of lead, EPA must act; it is not author­
ized to allow that level of risk. 
These points go a long way toward creating floors and ceilings and 
resolving the polar cases. Suppose, for example, that existing evidence 
shows significant increased mortality risks for ordinary people from 
sulfur dioxide at levels above 0.8 ppm, and increased hospital admis­
sions at levels about 0.6 ppm, but no mortality risk from sulfur dioxide 
levels below 0.7 ppm, and no increase in hospital admissions below 0.4 
ppm - and also that there is chronic plant injury at 0.1 ppm, and that 
respiratory problems increase among a small, sensitive subpopulation 
at 0.15 ppm. On the facts as stated, EP A's discretion is confined. It 
could not issue a primary standard above 0.6 ppm or so, and it could 
not issue a standard below 0.5 ppm or so - unless it could make ex­
trapolations from the evidence that would suggest a substantial risk at 
lower levels. Of course this is a stylized and artificial example, and of­
ten the evidence will allow a range of reasonable judgments. But that 
is a product of the uncertain science, not of any constitutional defect in 
the statute. Indeed, EPA itself has asserted that on the evidence, it 
was statutorily required to set the ozone standard somewhere between 
0.07 ppm and 0.09 ppm - a statement that, if true, is decisive on the 
nondelegation question. 
The approach I am suggesting - one that would understand the 
Act to create ceilings and floors - raises several questions of its own. 
It might be asked how the Act supports a distinction between trivial 
and significant risks; isn't this an invention of interpretation, rather 
than a legitimate reading of the Act? To be sure, the Act does not ex­
plicitly make such a distinction, but an interpretation to this effect is 
far from unnatural and indeed a good deal more compelling than the 
plurality's similar interpretation of the OSHA Act in the Benzene 
Case. 266 Surely such an interpretation should be favored if it is neces­
sary to prevent the Act from being a blank check to EPA. 
265. Indeed there is a reasonable argument that this was the case for the ozone regula­
tion at issue in American Trucking. See supra Section 11.B. 
266. The basic problem for the plurality in that case is that there was no statutory source 
for the "significant risk" requirement in the OSHA Act. This was a judicial invention, 
designed to make sense rather than nonsense of the law. See Industrial Union Dep't v. 
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1980). By contrast, the Clean Air Act's 
requirement of standards that are "requisite to protect the public health" and based on the 
underlying scientific "criteria document" is quite naturally understood as a requirement that 
the agency ban only serious risks. Of course the American Trucking court's concern was 
"how serious is serious?" - a legitimate question, but one best handled via conventional 
judicial review, as explained below in Section VI.B. 
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It might also be objected that this interpretation continues to allow 
EPA a large deal of discretion; isn't the statute unconstitutional even 
as construed, at least unless and until EPA can give more specificity to 
notions like "substantial" and "trivial"? The answer is that it is not. 
The most important precedent here is the Benzene Case itself. The 
OSHA statute, as construed by the Supreme Court, requires the 
agency to regulate "significant" risks to the point of "feasibility," and 
neither term is defined in the statute. This does not mean that the 
statute is unconstitutional until OSHA particularizes those terms. 
What it does mean is that any agency decision is subject to invalida­
tion on grounds of arbitrariness if the agency has not adequately ex­
plained itself. The upshot: This, not delegation, was the fundamental 
problem in American Trucking. 
My basic conclusion is that the nondelegation doctrine should be 
used only in the most extreme cases; that the Clean Air Act is not such 
a case; that the doctrine properly plays a role as a tool of statutory 
construction, emphatically with the Clean Air Act; and that the work 
done by the American Trucking court under the rubric of the nondele­
gation doctrine is far more reasonably done under review of agency 
action for arbitrariness. It is now time to turn to the questions that 
remain - questions that are not constitutional in status, but that are 
extremely important nonetheless. 
VI. OPTIONS, F'uTuRES, AND CLEAN AIR 
[A]n agency wielding the power over American life possessed by EPA 
should be capable of developing the rough equivalent of a generic unit of 
harm that takes into account population affected, severity and probabil­
ity. 
-American Trucking Ass'n v. EPA 261 
At the rate of progress permitted by . . .  judicial decisions, the EPA and 
OSHA could not possibly perform their statutorily assigned missions 
through use of rulemaking in less than several centuries. 
-Richard J. Pierce, Jr.268 
This Part discusses some aspects of the future of environmental 
law. An overview: What I have been calling "1970s environmental­
ism" refers to an approach to environmental protection that (a) sought 
"safe" levels of pollution, (b) favored command-and-control regula­
tion, (c) devoted little attention to priority-setting, and (d) seemed 
267. 175 F.3d 1027, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
268. Pierce, supra note 83, at 61. 
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oblivious to tradeoffs.269 As we have seen, this approach accomplished 
a great deal.270 But it is far too crude to provide a promising model for 
the future. A new approach - what appears to be a "second wave" of 
environmental reform, now in progress - would call for (a) economic 
incentives as a presumptive substitute for command-and-control, (b) 
some form of cost-benefit balancing, (c) attention to the "health­
health tradeoffs" sometimes involved in environmental regulation, 
and ( d) recognition that safety is a matter of degree, alongside guid­
ance for deciding when a certain level of pollution is unacceptably 
high. This is not the place for a full discussion of such reforms; but in 
the closing parts of this Section, I outline the ingredients of this "sec­
ond wave" approach.271 
At a minimum - and this is my principal claim here - EPA 
should take steps toward greater quantification of risks associated with 
various pollution levels, and at the same time consider alternatives in 
some detail. A primary goal of this approach would be to produce a 
long overdue "common law" of environmental protection - devel­
oped in the first instance by EPA and designed to promote a measure 
of coherence and interregulation consistency, and to ensure that 
regulations are not legitimately challenged as unduly lenient or unduly 
strict. It is appropriate for courts to require EPA to do this as part of 
judicial review for arbitrariness. But because judicial review itself 
threatens to have unfortunate systemic effects, above all by freezing 
the status quo, courts should continue current experiments with the 
idea of "remand without invalidation." Thus I suggest that the appro­
priate approach to the American Trucking case would be a remand to 
EPA for the required "benefits analysis," but a remand unaccompa­
nied by invalidation. 
269. See BREYER, supra note 5; GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 5, at 378-448; 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 245-381 {1997); Richard B. Stew­
art, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86, 97-114 {1986). 
270. See supra Section II.C. 
271. Still more ambitious reforms - perhaps a "third wave," now at its inception -
would place a greater emphasis on negotiated solutions, on "environmental contracting," see 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 269, at 363, and on cooperative approaches, see NEIL GUNNINGHAM 
& RICHARD JOHNSTONE, REFORMING WORKPLACE SAFETY: SYSTEM AND SANCTIONS 
{1999); Tinlothy A. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in Regula­
tory Theory, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 479, 482-503 {1995). It would also attempt to relieve 
the informational burden on centralized institutions, enlisting private groups in the determi­
nation of what approaches make best sense. See Charles Sabel et al., Beyond Backyard En­
vironmentalism, BOSTON REV., Oct./Nov. 1999, at 4, 5. Efforts at producing voluntary self­
regulation, and provision of information, would play a central role here. See GUNNINGHAM 
& GRABOSKY, supra note 5, at 378-448; Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 
CAL L. REV. {forthcoming 2000). Of course a full discussion of reforms of this sort would 
go well beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
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A. A Twenty-first Century EPA: Ceilings, Floors, and 
"Benefits Analysis" 
1. The Problem 
363 
I have emphasized that notwithstanding its commendable detail 
about the underlying evidence, EP A's explanation of its rule leaves 
much to be desired. This is not uncommon for agency explanations in 
the area of safety and health; similar problems can be found in the 
OSHA context and also in EPA action under other statutes.272 The 
agency's extensive discussion is abstract and conclusory on the key 
points.273 It does provide evidence that ozone and particulates can 
have adverse effects at current levels. But it does not give a suffi­
ciently clear sense of the extent of those adverse effects, nor does it 
explain why the particular, selected regulation was optimally suited to 
new information about health effects. The most informative docu­
ment is the agency's regulatory impact analysis, which could be used 
as the basis for a simple statement of the anticipated benefits of in­
creased regulation at various levels. 
The resulting problems have both technocratic and democratic di­
mensions. Without specification of the range of benefits to be antici­
pated from various approaches, there is a weak role for sound science 
in standard-setting. The best that science can do is to give a range of 
likely health and welfare gains from alternative initiatives, and the 
proper role of technocratic factors cannot be served if EPA speaks in 
vague, conclusory, or wholly qualitative terms. What is necessary is to 
have some sense of the magnitude of gains from competing ap­
proaches. From the democratic point of view, what is missing is an 
opportunity for the public, first, to have a sense of those gains, and 
second, to be able to receive an account of why the government has 
chosen one set of gains rather than another. Any particular choice re­
flects an important social judgment; officials should be clear about the 
values that underlie that choice. 
272 See Co"osion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (1991), where the court rightly 
found a number of unanswered objections to an agency rule banning asbestos - a rule that 
probably would have produced far more gain than harm on balance. (The agency reasona­
bly concluded that the rule would have saved well over 300 lives per year at a reasonable 
overall cost.) The court's decision eliminated the asbestos regulation, a ten-year effort, and 
seems in the process to have brought EP A's rulemaking efforts under the Toxic Substances 
Control Act to a complete halt. Cf. MASHA w & liARFST, supra note 207 (finding similar 
systemic effects of judicial review). A possible answer to this problem would have been for 
the court to remand without vacating the rule. See infra Section VI.B. 
273. See generally supra Section II.D. 
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2. Toward Benefits Analysis 
By way of response, I suggest that in issuing national ambient air 
quality standards, BP A should endeavor to provide a detailed "bene­
fits analysis," designed to strengthen both technocratic and democratic 
forces. In order to improve the role of science, the benefits analysis 
should attempt to describe, in both qualitative and quantitative terms, 
the various savings from the selected regulation and at least two rea­
sonable alternatives, one more stringent, the other less so. This is an 
effort to strengthen the role of technocratic forces by ensuring that 
BP A is acting pursuant to a clear understanding of the health and wel­
fare effects of reasonable options. In the process BP A should identify 
the residual risk left, under alternative approaches, by the pollutant in 
question and explain why that residual risk is not above the level 
"requisite to protect the public health." EPA should thus take steps to 
identify the size of the population affected, the severity of the various 
risks, and the likelihood that members of any particular group will suf­
fer the relevant effects. To the extent possible, it should attempt to 
quantify each of these items.274 It might say, for example, that forty 
million people are at risk, that ten million of these people are under 
the age of eighteen, that five million are over the age of sixty, that 
there is a 1/1,000 chance of cancer as a result of exposure, and that the 
relevant risks range from respiratory problems to hospitalization and 
missed work-days to cancer.275 
BP A should also explain why one set of savings, thus quantified, 
justifies regulation, whereas other sets of savings do not. Here there is 
an inevitable judgment of value, and no purely technocratic exercise. 
BP A might conclude, for example, that one approach leaves an exces­
sive risk to health, because it would result in between 500 and 1,500 
annual deaths as compared with the chosen approach - whereas an­
other initiative would go beyond the level required to protect the pub­
lic health, because it would result in between 0 and 100 annual deaths, 
most of them involving the elderly (and this a small extension of life). 
This is an effort to strengthen democratic forces in regulation, by en­
suring that the relevant value judgment is made publicly and exposed 
to democratic view. 
BP A should also attempt to reduce its own discretion by showing 
that at least as a presumption, risks above a certain level will not be 
274. An argument against quantification is provided in Heinzerling, supra note 8, at 
2042-69. Even if we accept Heinzerling's argument against the form of monetizing quantifi­
cation that is embodied in cost-benefit analysis, it is far from clear that the argument has 
weight against an attempt to quantify (rather than to monetize) benefits. For an argument in 
favor of both qualitative and quantitative presentations, see Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, J. LEGALSTUD. (forthcoming 2000). 
275. These risks might all be quantified. See infra app. tbl.2. 
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tolerated ("risk ceilings") and that risks below a certain level will be 
acceptable ("risk floors"). It should, in short, explain why a standard 
for ozone of 0.08 is to be preferred to a standard of 0.09 or 0.07, and 
do so by reference to generalizable criteria. If - as seems clear - the 
risks prevented by the new ozone regulation are far smaller than the 
risks that would be prevented by more stringent regulation of par­
ticulates, EPA should explain the apparent anomaly in terms of statu­
torily relevant factors. A chief advantage of this approach is that it 
should ensure interregulation consistency, in such a way as to combat, 
simultaneously, interest-group power, public torpor, and public over­
reaction with respect to certain pollutants. I return to this point 
shortly.276 
3. Difficulties, Uncertainty, Contentio� Assumptions 
A proposal of this kind raises several problems. An obvious diffi­
culty is connected with specifying the set of alternatives. Any agency 
could "frame" the alternatives so as to make its own choice seem plau­
sible, even inevitable. In the context of ozone, for example, the choice 
of 0.08 would have seemed entirely reasonable if EPA had compared 
that option to 0.12 (worse on health grounds) and 0.04 (regulating ap­
parently trivial risks). Thus it is necessary to ensure that the alterna­
tives be reasonable ones - that they be within the domain, or "strike 
zone," indicated by the scientific evidence.zn The CASAC recom­
mendations provide a great deal of help here. They specify the range 
of options that experts consider plausible, and if EPA compares its 
choice to both more and less stringent alternatives within the ap­
proximate domain suggested by CASAC, the problem of "framing" 
should be adequately addressed. 
Of course any analysis of expected benefits will depend on conten­
tious assumptions. The most serious problem here is that in many 
cases, scientific uncertainty will confound any attempt to quantify with 
precision. In these circumstances EP A's real question is one of timing: 
Does it act now, or does it wait until the scientific information pro­
vides more clarity with respect to health effects? Inaction would cre­
ate potential problems, possibly even a significant number of prevent­
able deaths; but action could create problems too, in the form of high 
costs for trivial health benefits. This is certainly a plausible reading of 
the situation with respect to both particulates and (especially) ozone; 
in both cases we do not know enough to assign specific numbers to dif­
ferent exposure levels. When existing evidence does not justify any 
particular number, then EPA should do the best that it can to specify a 
276. See infra text accompanying note 281. 
277. See supra note 243. 
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reasonable range.278 But scientific uncertainty is not the only problem. 
A projection of benefits must depend on a baseline about what would 
have happened without regulation, and (if converted into dollars) 
might also require use of the contingent valuation method, for which 
estimates are highly vulnerable to manipulation, depending on the na­
ture of the particular questions asked.279 Perhaps most important, the 
estimate of benefits in dollars will tum partly on the discount rate for 
future savings; a discount rate of 8% will produce very different num­
bers from a discount rate of 2%.280 In these circumstances, the bene­
fits analysis should be clear about the assumptions chosen, and should 
indicate the range of benefits and the numbers that would emerge 
from different assumptions. 
In terms of intergovernmental design, it makes sense to ensure that 
the analysis of the rule, and the alternatives to the rule, are developed 
in conjunction with another institution in the executive branch, such as 
the Office of Management and Budget, which already plays a role of 
this sort under Executive Order 12,866.281 The purpose of intergov­
ernmental review of this kind would be to ensure a form of internal 
"peer review," designed to overcome possible biases and errors on the 
part of any particular bureaucracy. An external check is well suited to 
accomplishing this goal. 
4. An Analogy: From Health to the Environment 
A possible approach to the evaluation of benefits comes from the 
health field, where much attention has focused on evaluating prefer­
ences for healthy conditions (or aversion to unhealthy ones) in terms 
of what are called quality-adjusted life years ("QAL Ys").282 A QAL Y 
is a measure of health based on people's attitudes toward various con­
ditions. It rejects the concept of monetary evaluation of health; in­
stead, it focuses on how people value various health states. It seeks to 
generate a means of comparing various states of health !hrough a sin­
gle metric, so that comparisons and tradeoffs can be made for public 
policy purposes. The measure attempts to take into account both 
quantitative benefits of health improvement, such as increase in life 
expectancy, and more qualitative improvements, such as quality-of-life 
benefits. 
278. See infra app. for examples, taken from the RIA. 
279. See Lutter & Demuth, supra note 8, at 6-10. 
280. See Heinzerling, supra note 8, at 2018. 
281. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. {1993 compilation) 638 {1994), reprinted in 5 
U.S.C.A. § 601 {1996). 
282. The measure was first described in Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, Where 
Now for Saving Lives?, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 {1976). 
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The QAL Y approach works by asking people through interview 
techniques to express their strength of preference for various health 
states. The most advanced methods disaggregate the process by ask­
ing people to describe how they would value a health improvement 
along several dimensions: mobility, physical activity, social activity, 
and the kinds of symptom effects involved.283 The answers to these 
questions are combined into a single scale, ranked 0 (for death) to 1.0 
(for optimum functioning). The result is an index of utility for health 
states measured on an interval (or cardinal) scale. By independently 
determining the cost of various treatments and their likely outcomes, 
researchers can suggest a cost per QAL Y of various public programs. 
Alternative programs can be ranked in what is essentially a utility­
based cost-effectiveness scale.284 
In the context of the Clean Air Act, it makes little sense to engage 
in surveys about how people rank various health risks. In the govern­
ing RIA, EPA has already attempted to measure both benefits and 
willingness to pay for reductions of various risks,285 and it could easily 
adapt these figures to generate numbers for overall risk reductions, 
defined in terms of some overall measure, perhaps that of quality­
adjusted life years. Lives saved might, for example, be converted into 
a life-years saved number, and to this EPA could add various numbers 
representing the other health gains to be brought about by the regula­
tion. The approach to particulates might be compared to, and squared 
with, the approach to ozone, and these approaches might also be ra­
tionalized with existing regulation of lead, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen 
oxides, and carbon monoxide.286 
5. Toward a (New) Common Law of Regulatory Protection 
Through such a route EPA could begin to develop what it should 
have provided at least a decade ago: a common law of public health 
protection. This would reflect a system of judgments indicating when 
283. An important work in the development of these multidimensional measures is 
Robert M. Kaplan & James W. Bush, Health-Related Quality for Life Measurement of 
Evaluation Research and Policy Analysis, 1 HEALTH PSYCH. 61, 68-69 (1982). For a general 
survey of QAL Y approaches, see George W. Torrance, Measurement of Health State Utilities 
for Economic Appraisal: A Review, 5 J. HEALTH ECON. 1 (1986). For a more recent general 
discussion, see Robert Fabian, The Qualy Approach, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY: 
AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 118 (George Tolley et al. eds., 1994). 
284. An important advantage of the QAL Y method is that it eliminates the distribution­
of-income problems of other methods. The QAL Y approach rests on a strict egalitarian 
premise; the value of various states of health should be independent of the economic status 
of the particular people in those states. 
285. See infra app. As mentioned above, the tables in the appendix are taken from in­
formation in the RIA. 
286. See infra app. 
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a given set of harms is sufficient to trigger additional regulation, and 
also when a set of harms is too trivial to count as a legally cognizable 
public health problem. And eventually it should be possible to have 
quite disaggregated data, showing the geographical areas in which 
health problems are most concentrated. For example, the health risks 
of lead were concentrated in the inner city;287 the same may well be 
true of particulates. If this is so, a careful "benefits analysis" could 
pave the way toward an understanding of where regulatory activity 
would accomplish the most good, in a way that would diminish some 
of the problems associated with a nationally uniform policy. Such an 
approach could also help to invigorate local processes for environ­
mental protection, so as to allow a higher degree of coordination be­
tween the national government and states and localities.288 
This final point raises a general question about the content of any 
such common law: the status, for purposes of law and policy, of inter­
regulation inconsistency. Suppose, for example, that EPA leaves a 
much higher residual risk for particulates than for ozone, as indeed it 
plainly appears to have done here.289 Is this indefensible, or even un­
lawful? As we have seen, one of the virtues of the approach suggested 
here is that it attempts to promote consistency in the rulemaking proc­
ess, in such a way as to reduce the power of well-organized private 
groups. It might seem to follow that if BP A allows a much higher re­
sidual risk for one substance than for another, it should be vulnerable 
on judicial review; and so too if it allows a much lower residual risk for 
a particular pollutant. This does indeed follow. The question is 
whether BP A can defend apparent interregulation inconsistency in 
statutorily relevant terms (as, for example, by showing that children 
are at particular risk from one or another problem). If it cannot, it has 
acted unlawfully. 
There is a still broader point in the background here. The case for 
clear standards is strongest in a "mass justice" situation - a context in 
which an agency must decide a wide range of cases. In such situations, 
standardlessness is unacceptable - it creates a recipe for abuse, pro­
ducing unequal treatment of the similarly situated.290 When an agency 
is making a one-shot decision, or two or three decisions, the argument 
for binding standards is less insistent. The point helps explain the de­
cision of the court of appeals in American Trucking, where two regula­
tions were before the court, not easily reconciled with one another, 
and where many years of NAAQS decisions made the situation re-
287. See MELNICK, supra note 63, at 267, 276. 
288. See Sabel et al., supra note 271. 
289. See infra app. 
290. See generally JERRYL. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983). 
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semble more closely a "mass justice" problem. In these circumstances, 
the proposal for "benefits analysis" is designed to ensure a set of rela­
tively uniform and transparent standards, more suitable to the future 
of environmental protection, where the whole area will achieve a de­
gree of maturity. The development of a common law of regulatory 
protection, generated in the first instance by agencies rather than 
judges, would be a crucial step in this endeavor. 
B. Ordinary (Not Extraordinary) Judicial Review: Democracy­
Promoting Minimalism in Practice 
As I have suggested, conventional judicial review could have ac­
commodated the American Trucking court's reasonable concerns.291 
In order to explore how democracy-promoting minimalism might 
work, I suggest here that the appropriate approach would be to hold 
both regulations invalid on the ground that the agency did not ade­
quately explain its choice of the particular levels that it prescribed. 
The most serious problem with this approach is that it threatens exces­
sive judicial entanglement with the rulemaking process, in a way that 
would likely have unfortunate systemic effects, in the form of a power­
ful bias toward protecting the status quo. The best response to this 
concern is to choose one of the two recent innovations in judicial re­
view of administrative action: allowing the agency to issue an interim 
rule, or (better still) remanding the regulations without vacating them. 
1. Failing the Hard Look 
A quite standard opinion would have invalidated the agency's 
rules on the ground that there was an insufficiently clear explanation 
of the key policy decisions. On this view, the problem was not one of 
delegation, but of a lack of clarity about why lines were drawn exactly 
where EPA drew them. Why did EPA choose 0.08 ppm rather than 
0.07 ppm, or 0.06 ppm? The difficulty of answering that question in 
concrete terms would have justified a remand to the agency. 
This approach might be generalized. It could apply, for example, 
to a judgment of OSHA that a regulation is necessary to address a 
"significant risk," or to an administrative decision to proceed against 
an "unreasonable risk." In such cases, courts might require agencies 
to quantify the problem that they are attempting to reduce, and ex­
plain why they chose the approach at issue rather than one more or 
less stringent. A simple requirement of this kind might strengthen the 
hand of technocratic and policy-analytic forces in the regulatory state, 
291. See supra Section V.B. 
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thus weakening the hand of self-interested private groups; it might 
also promote transparency about the relevant value judgments. 
2. Surviving a Softer Look 
Another type of conventional opinion, more deferential to the 
agency and also reasonable, might have upheld both the ozone and the 
PM standards, on the ground that neither had been shown to be arbi­
trary or capricious - the agency sufficiently explained why the risk 
was less severe below the standard it set, and also why the risk was too 
severe at any point above that standard. The agency did show that 
significant risks could be expected, especially from particulates, where 
thousands of people, on a reasonable view of the evidence, were at 
risk each year. To be sure, significant challenges were made to the 
science underlying both decisions. But the record contained substan­
tial support for EP A's particular choices - at least enough support to 
satisfy a court engaged in the ordinary scrutiny of EPA decisions. 
This approach might also be generalized. For example, a court 
might uphold OSHA action so long as the agency has explained why a 
particular risk is significant and explained, at least in broad terms, why 
it did not select a more or less stringent alternative. 
3. The Problem of Ossification and the Tyranny of the 
Status Quo Revisited 
Both of these opinions would have been entirely responsible, and 
the choice between them, both for the case at hand and for future ap­
proaches to judicial review, is not easy. Ultimately I conclude that the 
first is preferable in the context of American Trucking. If the second 
is to be preferred, it is not because EPA was doing its job well, but for 
reasons that go to institutional competence and that involve the harm­
ful systemic effects of the seemingly innocuous, one-shot remand. 
With respect to institutional competence: EPA is of course ac­
countable to the President, and environmental issues tend to be highly 
visible and well ventilated publicly - as well ventilated, perhaps, as 
any other issue of regulatory policy. Certainly the PM and ozone rules 
were subject to a high degree of public scrutiny. At the same time, 
these are technically complex questions on which EPA has a strong 
comparative advantage over the judiciary. If there is a clear blunder, 
or a judgment that does not depend on either a reasonable assessment 
of the scientific evidence or (where the evidence leaves gaps) a rea­
sonable and articulated judgment of value, of course the court should 
interfere. But otherwise it should not. 
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With respect to systematic effects: A great deal of attention has 
been paid to the phenomenon of the "ossification" of notice-and­
comment rulemaking,292 and indeed a high priority, for the future of 
administrative law, is to devise means to overcome the problem. 
Originally intended as a quick and effective alternative to formal, on­
the-record rulemaking, executive and especially judicial innovations 
have converted notice-and-comment rulemaking into an exceptionally 
time-consuming affair, often consuming many years, frequently half a 
decade and more. In fact EPA estimates that informal rulemaking 
typically takes five years.293 Consider, for example, the fact that EPA's 
only rulemaking under the Toxic Substances Control Act, involving 
asbestos, cost millions of dollars and took over a decade to complete 
- and that the rule that emerged was eventually struck down as in­
adequately justified.294 Aggressive judicial review contributes to these 
delays, and when the result is to remand a rule, the ultimate conse­
quence can be to discourage rulemaking altogether. For example, the 
impressive study of Mashaw and Harfst shows that the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") has come close to 
abandoning rulemaking, largely because of the problems introduced 
by "hard look" judicial review.295 Instead of rulemaking, NHTSA acts 
largely through after-the-fact recalls, to which courts are far more 
sympathetic. It is far from clear that American drivers are better off 
with this shift. Nor is this an isolated example. Something similar ap­
pears to have happened with the Consumer Product Safety Commis­
sion, and EPA seems to have abandoned enforcement of the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, largely as a result of intense judicial scrutiny 
of EPA activity.296 
Now we cannot conclude that a certain judicial role is inappropri­
ate simply because it leads to agency inactivity. Perhaps it is good for 
exactly that reason. The problem is when strict judicial supervision 
has the effect of freezing the status quo, whatever the status quo hap­
pens to be. This is an unintended systemic effect of hard look review. 
Particular judges, reviewing particular rules, can be made alert to par­
ticular problems in those rules, especially when the rules are under at­
tack by experienced, inventive lawyers. For some rules, it is easy to 
imagine seemingly decisive objections from both sides - as public in-
292. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Proc­
ess, 41 DUKE LJ. 1385 (1992); MASHA w & HARFsT, supra note 207, at 224-54. 
293. See CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT, 
RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING 108 (1993). 
294. See Pierce, supra note 83, at 61. 
295. See MASHAW & HARFsT, supra note 207, at 10-19. 
296. See id. at 225; see also 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 250, at 372-73; Pierce, supra 
note 83, at 61. 
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terest lawyers show, quite convincingly, why a certain rule should have 
been made more stringent, and as industry lawyers show, with respect 
to the same rule, why greater leniency was legally mandated. Nor is 
this fanciful; something of this kind has happened on several occasions 
in the "hard look" era.297 
There is no simple cure for the problem, especially in light of evi­
dence that hard look review has often accomplished considerable 
good. But it makes sense to say that in the absence of a violation of a 
statute, courts should not invalidate regulations unless the objection 
goes to the heart of the agency's conclusions - unless there has been 
a quite serious error of analysis, or there is good reason to think that 
the rule will make things worse rather than better in light of statutorily 
relevant criteria. Of course advice of this sort will not decide concrete 
questions. But it suggests serious problems with the invalidation of 
EPA's ozone and particulates regulations. 
4. Procedural Innovations: Administrative Law Minimalism 
Thus far a court might seem to be in equipoise between two rea­
sonable alternatives: a decision to uphold the regulations on the 
grounds just stated, and a decision to invalidate them on the theory 
that the agency offered no clear explanation of the particular level it 
chose. The choice between the alternatives might turn on assessment 
of the systemic effects of one or another course. The danger of invali­
dation is that it could greatly delay this or any other EPA rulemaking, 
in a way that would cause a powerful status quo bias, one that could 
not be defended. The danger of validation is that it would allow EPA 
rules that have not been persuasively defended and that might do less 
good than harm. 
But two recent procedural innovations help resolve the dilemma, 
and point the way to a sensible resolution of the American Trucking 
case. Courts of appeals now appear prepared to allow agencies to is­
sue "interim rules" on remand,298 so as to ensure against the harm that 
may come from returning to the prerule status quo; and courts are also 
prepared, in appropriate circumstances, to remand rules without va­
cating them.299 The "interim rules" approach makes best sense when 
297. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 408-09 
(1971) (finding approval of highway through park inadequately supported); Citizens to Pre­
serve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 357 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Tenn. 1973) (finding disapproval 
of same highway inadequately supported), rev'd, 494 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1974). 
298. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Checkosky 
v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 462-66 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam); Mid-Tex Elec. Coop. v. FERC, 
822F.2d 1123, 1130-32 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Pierce, supra note 83, at 73-75. 
299. See Davis County Solid Waste Management v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1454, 1459-60 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997}; Idaho Farm v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405-06 (9th Cir. 1995); AMA v. Reno, 57 
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the agency can show that without such rules, people will face serious 
risks of one kind or another; the "remand without vacating" approach 
makes best sense when the agency may well be able to justify its action 
on remand. Both of these ideas are designed to ensure that rules that 
are highly likely to be reasonable are not struck from the books, in a 
way that could produce serious problems. Properly understood, they 
do not allow agencies to proceed with inadequately justified rules if it 
appears unlikely that those rules could be lawfully explained, or if it 
appears that little will be lost with invalidation. 
Hence we arrive at an appropriate approach to these cases, one 
with general application: The rules should be held unlawful, and re­
manded to the agency; but they should not be vacated, at least when 
the agency can show (a) that it may be able to generate a justification 
that will satisfy judicial review, and (b) that invalidation of the rule 
may generate significant risks (by, for example, allowing people to be 
exposed to nontrivial dangers, or by preventing the agency from initi­
ating a program for reducing such risks ).300 After the agency attempts 
to justify its regulation on remand, its decision may be appealed to the 
court, which can evaluate the new justification and uphold or invali­
date the regulation as appropriate. An approach of this kind seems 
especially sensible for the particulates regulation, which is designed to 
counteract what, on a reasonable reading of the evidence, count as 
quite serious risks to life and health. The problem with invalidation is 
that it would prevent the agency from beginning implementation and 
require the agency to start largely from scratch, a process that may re­
quire years or more of rulemaking activity. A remand without invali­
dation would allow the agency to proceed if (as appears quite possi­
ble) the regulation can be adequately defended by reference to the 
criteria I have outlined. Things are more difficult for ozone, because 
the risks are far lower, and because nonregulation may actually pro­
duce health benefits;301 but here as well, a remand without invalidation 
would probably be the best way to proceed. 
It would be possible to object that the technique of "remand with­
out invalidation" creates unfortunate incentives for administrators, 
above all because it permits the continued legality and even the en-
F.3d 1129, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 28 F.3d at 1268; Checkosky, 23 F.3d 
at 462-65; Allied-Signal, Inc. v. NRC, 988 F.2d 146, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (announcing that 
court will not vacate rules because of inadequacy in agency reasoning if agency has a serious 
possibility of correcting the deficiency on remand and vacation may be disruptive); Mid-Tex 
Elec. Coop., 822 F.2d at 1132-34. 
300. Some support for BP A's choices here, though to be sure not decisive, comes from 
the fact that California made quite similar decisions not less than a decade ago. See James 
M. Lents, A Review of National Ozone and Particulate Matter Air Quality Standards In Light 
of Long-Standing California Air Quality Standards, 11 TUI.. ENVTL. L.J. 415, 421-23 (1998). 
301. See infra Section VI.A.5. 
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forcement of rules that have been found to be inadequately justified 
(and that may not ultimately survive review). The enforcement of 
these rules may cost millions and even billions of dollars. If so, isn't 
invalidation preferable? To be sure, a system in which inadequately 
justified rules are invalidated would create more pressure to produce 
adequate justifications in the first instance. But the proper response 
to this concern is not to invalidate all inadequately justified rules, but 
to restrict the "remand without invalidation" technique to special cir­
cumstances, above all (a) to rules that might well tum out to be valid 
(b) in conditions in which invalidation would produce serious prob­
lems for the legitimate policies that underlie the rules in question. The 
court of appeals for the D.C. Circuit has made considerable progress 
in drawing the necessary lines.302 
There is a broader point in the background here. The techniques 
of remand without invalidation, and of allowing interim rules, can be 
seen as a form of administrative law "minimalism," akin to judicial 
minimalism in constitutional law generally.303 Such techniques do no 
more than is necessary to resolve a case. Indeed, these forms of mini­
malism are democracy-reinforcing insofar as they attempt to ensure 
that agency decisions are based on grounds that are both transparent 
to the public and sufficient to justify the regulation in light of statutory 
criteria. 
5. A Health-Health Wrinkle 
A difficult question, not addressed thus far, is raised by a particular 
claim with respect to EPA's ozone regulation: that ground-level 
ozone has health benefits, and that these benefits were not taken into 
account by the agency. There is evidence that ozone reduces the risk 
of both cataracts and cancers.304 If taken into account, the health 
benefits of ozone at current levels may well be roughly equivalent to 
the health costs. But EPA refused to consider those health benefits. 
In an interesting application of "health-health" analysis, the court of 
appeals held that the refusal was unlawful.305 
In general, it is right to say that agencies should be required to take 
account of the health problems sometimes produced by regulation de-
302 See Davis County, 108 F.3d at 1457; AMA, 57 F.3d at 1135; Allied Signal, 988 F.2d 
at 150-51 (announcing that a court will not vacate rules because of inadequacy in agency rea­
soning if agency has a serious possibility of correcting the deficiency on remand and vacation 
may be disruptive). 
303. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 3-72. 
304. See Lutter & DeMuth, supra note 8, at 10. 
305. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1051-52 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(per curiam). 
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signed to reduce health problems. This kind of health-health tradeoff 
can take many different forms.306 In typical cases, the regulation of 
one risk, like that associated with asbestos, may give rise to further 
risks as a result of the substituted products. The most adventurous 
claims for "health-health" comparisons arise when a costly regulation 
imposes health risks simply by virtue of its cost.307 If a regulation pro­
duces less employment and more poverty, it may result in worse 
health as well. But these are adventurous claims, because they depend 
on contentious projections about the disemployment effects of par­
ticular regulations. 
For the ozone rule, the argument for taking health-health tradeoffs 
into account seemed especially insistent, for the claim was far from in­
direct, and there was nothing speculative or abstruse about the causal 
chain. If ozone protects against cancers and cataracts, it is possible 
that a regulation of ozone will cause serious health problems. The text 
of the Act is quite ambiguous on the point, and the court was wrong to 
say that it unambiguously required the agency to address the benefi­
cial effects of air pollutants.308 But the court was right to hold that 
even if it was ambiguous, the agency interpretation was unreasonable. 
The rule was properly found inadequately justified on this ground, and 
it may well be that after remand, the agency will be unable to explain 
any failure to take account of the effects of ozone in combating cata­
racts and cancer. 
6. A Final Contrast 
There is of course a commonality between the approach taken by 
the American Trucking court and the approach I am suggesting. 
Where the American Trucking court said that the ambient air quality 
standards provisions of the Clean Air Act are unconstitutional unless 
EPA imposes limits on its own discretion, I have argued that ambient 
air quality standards are valid if, and only if, EPA is able to generate a 
"benefits analysis" that operates to constrain EPA discretion and to 
promote interregulation consistency. The goals of the two approaches 
are quite close. The disadvantage of the American Trucking approach 
is that it involves unnecessary, even reckless, use of the Constitution 
- and does so in a way that threatens to raise too many questions 
about too many statutes. By contrast, the approach I have suggested 
has firm roots in the AP A and in existing doctrine, and promises to 
306. See JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATIIAN B. WIENER, RISK VS. RISK 247-68 (1995); 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, Health-Health Tradeoffs, in FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 298, 
298-317 (1997). 
307. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 306, at 298-317. 
308. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1051-52. 
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improve regulatory practice without calling for an excessive judicial 
role. 
C. Congress: Safety and Its Cost 
Should Congress amend the national ambient air quality provisions 
of the Clean Air Act? This is not the place for an extended discussion 
of that question; but the analysis thus far suggests three possibilities. 
1. How Safe Is Safe Enough? 
As emphasized throughout, a crucial defect of the national ambi­
ent air quality provisions is that they seem to assume that whether air 
is "safe" can be assessed solely on the basis of the facts. The truth is 
that the facts might be able to show the degree of risk (at least within a 
range), but they cannot show whether any particular degree of safety 
is "safe enough." Whether or not pollutants lack safe thresholds, "the 
paradigm of selecting a standard at the lowest-observable-effects-level 
and then providing an 'adequate margin of safety' is not possible. "309 
The result of the statutory framework is to misframe the key question 
and also to give EPA little guidance for answering and asking that 
question. As we have seen, EPA has greatly struggled with the re­
sulting difficulties. 
Congress should amend the statute to identify the factors for EPA 
to consider in making the judgment about appropriate national stan­
dards. Congress might offer substantive guidance by saying, for ex­
ample, that EPA must consider risk severity, size of affected popula­
tion, and likelihood of adverse effects at various exposure levels. On 
the procedural side, it might require EPA to identify, to the extent 
possible, the nature of the risks that it is reducing, and at the same 
time to attempt to quantify the relevant risk reductions. The strongest 
argument against an amendment to this effect is that it is unnecessary; 
if EPA moved in the directions suggested above, it would essentially 
be interpreting the current statute as if it contained instructions of ex­
actly this sort. But an amendment of this kind would at least provide a 
clear legislative signal, and move EPA judgments in the direction of 
greater transparency. 
309. See EPA's Rulemakings on the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Par· 
ticulate Matter and Ozone: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law 
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 89 {1997) (prepared statement of George 
T. Woolf, Former Chairman, EP A's Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee). 
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2. More Flexible Tools 
We now know that significant cost savings can be achieved by us­
ing more flexible, market-oriented instruments, such as tradable pollu­
tion permits rather than uniform national requirements.310 Sometimes, 
however, EPA does not choose such instruments even when it is le­
gally authorized to do so.311 It would make sense to amend the statute 
to require EPA, wherever feasible, to use economic incentives rather 
than a "command-and-control" approach.312 
It is clear that an approach of this kind could save substantial re­
sources, and if the instruments are properly chosen, it should do so 
without at the same time compromising air quality goals.313 An effort 
to encourage EPA to select less burdensome alternatives could send a 
desirable signal to attempt the least-cost methods of obtaining regula­
tory goals, and might in addition spur creative experimentation. 
3. Costs and Benefits 
A possible lesson of EPA experience with national standards is 
that EPA should be required or at least permitted to consider costs 
when setting such standards. Indeed, it is not entirely clear that the 
statute should be construed to forbid cost-benefit analysis from 
EPA,314 though lower courts have unanimously concluded otherwise.315 
If the Supreme Court does not reject the lower courts' view, it is worth 
giving serious consideration to a statutory change. 
The basic reasoning here is straightforward. If a reduction from 
0.08 to 0.07 would be a trivial expense, surely it should be required; if 
310. See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PuBLIC ADMINISTRATION, THE 
ENVIRONMENT GOES TO MARKET (1994). See also supra text accompanying notes 88-90. 
311. See Gray, supra note 14, at 235-36. 
312 Cf. Regulatory Reform: Hearings Before the Senate Comm on Governmental Af­
fairs, 104th Cong. 194 (1995) (statement of Jonathan B. Wiener) (urging general amendment 
to allow agencies to choose incentive-based regulation). 
313. See generally Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons 
for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361 (1989). 
314. After Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984), ambiguities in the statute are to be resolved by the agency, and there is a good 
argument that the key provision of the Act is ambiguous. Recall that the statute requires 
standards to be set at a level "requisite to protect the public health," and it is not unreason­
able to say that that level is at least partly a function of the costs of the regulation. What 
level is "requisite" may well depend on the costs as well as benefits of getting there. Ironi­
cally, however, the view that the agency can choose, or fail to choose, cost-benefit analysis 
seems to aggravate rather than to diminish the old nondelegation doctrine, even though an 
agency choice of that kind would seem to satisfy the new nondelegation doctrine. See Indus­
trial Union v. OSHA, 37 F3d 665, 669-70 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (concluding that the nondelega­
tion problem would be eliminated if OSHA chose cost-benefit analysis). 
315. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text 
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it would cost billions of dollars, there had better be good grounds to 
believe very substantial health benefits would follow. A possible ar­
gument to the contrary is that national standards operate as aspira­
tions, not ordinary law, and aspirations, at least, should be set on a 
health-only basis - not because there is a magic place where air qual­
ity is "safe," but because it is valuable to obtain, and use, a techno­
cratic judgment that people should have air quality of a certain speci­
fied sort.316 The problem is that it is impossible to assess "safety" in a 
cost vacuum. In general, cost-benefit analysis should be followed, ac­
knowledging that it will raise some hard questions of value.317 
The best argument against an amendment to require cost-benefit 
analysis is that the statute, complex as it is, actually embodies a better 
accommodation of costs and benefits than would a statute that re­
quired ',cost-benefit analysis at the level of standard-setting.318 On this 
view, the optimal system is one in which EPA makes an initial, purely 
health-based judgment, and then the process of implementation allows 
costs to play a role at various stages, emphatically including an expec­
tation that implementation will not be immediate and will in fact be a 
produet of a continuing inquiry into whether compliance is worth­
while, f11 things considered.319 A possible virtue of this state of affairs 
is precisely the aspirational quality of the health-based standard, set­
ting a target against which various state performances can be meas­
ured. The aspirational quality can also contribute to technology-
316. See the quotation from Administrator Browner, supra text accompanying note 50. 
Administrator Browner goes on to say: 
While cost-benefit analysis is a tool that can be helpful in developing strategies to implement 
our nation's air quality standards, we believe it is inappropriate for use to set the standards 
themselves. In many cases, cost-benefit analysis has overstated costs. In addition, many 
kinds of benefits are virtually impossible to quantify - how do I put a dollar value on reduc­
tions in a child's lung function or the premature aging of lungs or increased susceptibility to 
respiratory infection? 
Clean Air Hearings, supra note 50, at 282 (statement of Carol M. Brovmer, Administrator, 
EPA). Ironically, the Regulatory Impact Analysis required by President Clinton engages in 
monetization of just this kind. See generally infra app. 
317. See Sunstein, supra note 274. A good treatment of some of the questions of value 
can be found in recent testimony of Richard Revesz. See Clean Air Act Authorizations: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and Nuclear Safety, 
106th Cong. (1999) {Testimony of Richard L. Revesz), available in LEXIS.COM, Legislation 
& Politics Library, U.S. Congress Folder, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional 
Testimony File. 
318. This seems to be the conclusion of William F. Pedersen, Science and Public Policy: 
A Case Study of the Clean Air Act, 16 PACEENVT'LL. REv. 15 (1998). Pedersen argues that 
a purely health-based standard can force technological innovation, see id. at 23-24, and also 
stimulate and focus public debate, see id. at 22-23; he ends with the interesting suggestion 
that EPA should be required to set standards "tight enough to protect against all clearly 
demonstrated health or welfare effects," but that EPA should be allowed to consider costs 
and technical feasibility in choosing the "margin of safety," id. at 30. 
319. See Farber, supra note 11, at 315-18, for an illuntinating discussion of this point. 
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forcing, an important and often highly desirable phenomenon in envi­
ronmental protection,320 and a phenomenon to which cost-benefit 
analysis is, at least in practice,321 unlikely to contribute. 
In the abstract, it is hard to know whether this pragmatic argument 
is valid.322 What is clear is that the statutory scheme, pragmatically de­
fensible as it may be, is far from transparent, and provides a set of con­
fusing signals to the American public. 
CONCLUSION 
Whenever an agency issues a regulation designed to diminish risks 
to health, safety, or the environment, it should attempt to identify the 
gains sought by the particular regulation it has chosen, and it should 
compare these gains to those under at least two reasonable alternative 
regimes, one stricter and one more lenient. In this light, the most seri­
ous problem with EP A's performance in issuing national air quality 
standards is that it usually fails to explain, in simple, concise terms, its 
decision to require a particular level of ambient air quality. Some­
times EPA acts as if it were pursuing "safety" and ensuring "safe lev­
els," without sufficiently acknowledging that for most pollutants, the 
serious question is what degree of safety. To its credit, EPA invaria­
bly offers extensive discussions of the underlying data, demonstrating 
that there is a genuine health risk at current levels. But to the extent 
that it provides an explanation of its particular choices, the discussion 
often involves little more than evidence of nontrivial adverse effects at 
those current levels - evidence that may well argue for a reduction 
from current levels, but does not by itself call for any particular regula­
tory standard. 
In this Article, I have argued that EPA (and other agencies in­
volved in similar tasks) should offer a detailed "benefits analysis." 
The central goal of this approach would be to create a kind of federal 
common law of environmental protection, generated in the first in-
320. Technology-forcing is not desirable if the costs of the forcing exceed the benefits -
if, for example, the new technology contributes little to air quality, but substantially in­
creases prices and diminishes wages. 
321. In principle, a competent cost-benefit analysis would include the costs (and bene­
fits) of new technological developments, and indeed this issue is discussed in the particulates 
and ozone regulatory impact analysis. See RIA, supra note 70, ch. 11. The problem is that 
government is likely to have very little information about the cost of technological innova­
tion, and industry is likely to overstate those costs by a significant amount. See W. KIP 
VISCUS!, FATAL TRADEOFFS 161-80 (1993) (discussing substantial overstatement of compli­
ance costs). 
322. See the valuable article by James E. Krier, On the Topology of National Standards 
in a Federal System -And Why It Matters, 54 Mn. L. REV. 1226 (1995), a staunch and long­
time defender of cost-benefit analysis for the Clean Air Act, who acknowledges the prag­
matic possibility. 
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stance by administrative agencies, and designed to promote consis­
tency and rationality in the protection of health and safety. I have also 
defended a form of democracy-promoting minimalism for administra­
tive law - the particular form of minimalism that is embodied in the 
remand, often (and increasingly) unaccompanied by invalidation. 
The Clean Air Act should not be held unconstitutional, and BP A 
should not be required, on pain of constitutional invalidation, to come 
up with a "generic unit of harm" to encompass population affected, 
severity, and probability. The new nondelegation doctrine is a large 
mistake. On the other hand, ordinary judicial review should require 
any national ambient air quality standard to be accompanied by an 
adequate explanation of why that level, rather than one more or less 
stringent, has been selected. By itself, this requirement calls (to the 
extent feasible) for a high degree of quantification from BP A; it also 
bears on the performance of other regulatory agencies entrusted with 
the task of protecting health, safety, and the environment. It calls for 
invalidation, and not merely remand, where the agency is unable to 
offer an explanation of its choice of one level of regulation rather than 
another. A requirement of this kind would mark a key moment in the 
shift from the rigidity and simplicity of 1970s environmentalism to­
ward a new and more promising approach - one that places a high 
premium on assessing the magnitude of problems, ensuring consis­
tency across regulations, limiting interest-group power, acquiring bet­
ter information, and authorizing democratic control of regulatory 
choices. 
My principal claim here is that both courts and EPA should con­
strue the Act so as to prevent regulation of small risks and so as to re­
quire regulation of substantial risks - and BP A should explain, as 
quantitatively as possible, what must be shown in order for a risk to 
qualify, or not to qualify, as substantial. It is excessive, a form of 
rhetoric, to say that on BP A's view, it is entitled to choose any level 
between zero risk and a level slightly below "London's Killer Fog." 
But it is not a form of rhetoric to think that if BP A has not limited its 
own discretion by speaking in less conclusory terms, the Clean Air Act 
raises problems for both regulatory policy and democratic self­
government. The ultimate goal of the forms of the democracy­
promoting minimalism that I have endorsed here would be to ensure 
better policy analysis and greater transparency of decision, in a way 
that should simultaneously promote democratic, economic, and air 
quality goals. 
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APPENDIX 
1. Particulate Matter: 
PM 2.5: 
a. July 18, 1997: EPA sets a public health standard for fine 
particle pollution. 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652 (1997). 
Total Suspended Particulates and PM 10: 
a. April 28, 1971: EPA promulgates the primary and secon­
dary standards for particulate matter. Primary: 75 micro­
grams per cubic meter - annual geometric mean; 260 
µg/m3, 24-hour average not to be exceeded more than once 
per year. Secondary: 150µg/m3 maximum 24-hour concen­
tration not to be exceeded more than once per year; 60 
µg/m3 annual geometric mean. 36 Fed. Reg. 8186, 8187 
(1971). 
b. July 1, 1987: EPA changes the indicator for PM from total 
suspended particles to PMw 24-hour PM10 of 150 µg/m3 
with no more than one expected exceedance per year; an­
nual PM10 standard of 50 µg/m3 expected annual arithmetic 
mean; secondary standards identical to primary standards. 
52 Fed. Reg. 24,634 (1987). 
c. July 18, 1997: EPA promulgates regulation which is later 
struck down by D.C. Circuit. Two new P� standards 
added, set at 15 µg/m3 and 65 µg/m3• 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,652. 
2. Ozone: 
a. April 30, 1971: EPA promul�ates first NAAQS for photo­
chemical oxidants. 160 µg/m ; 0.08 ppm maximum 1-hour 
concentration not to be exceeded more than once per year. 
36 Fed. Reg. at 8187. 
b. April 20, 1977: EPA reviews and updates criteria docu­
ment. 42 Fed. Reg. 20,493 (1977). 
c. February 8, 1979: EPA revises primary standard to 0.12 
ppm and sets secondary standard identical to primary. 44 
Fed. Reg. 8202 (1979). 
d. March 9, 1993: EPA reviews air quality standards and de­
cides not to revise standards. 58 Fed. Reg. 13,008 (1993). 
e. February 3, 1994: EPA announces it will review standards. 
59 Fed. Reg. 5164 (1994). 
f. July 18, 1997: EPA promulgates new standards which are 
later struck down by the D.C. Circuit Court. Primary: 8-
hour standard at a level of 0.08 ppm. Secondary: identical 
0.08 ppm standard. 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (1997). 
(A more complete history of ozone is presented in Section II.B of the 
U.S. EPA OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, 
REVIEW OF NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR 
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OZONE: ASSESSMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION 
(1996).) 
3. Sulfur Oxides (Sulfur Dioxides): 
a. April 30, 1971: EPA promulgates primary and secondary 
NAAQS for sulfur oxides. Primary: 80 µg/m3, 0.03 ppm an­
nual arithmetic mean; 365 µg/m3; 0.14 ppm maximum 24-
hour concentration not to be exceeded more than once per 
year. Secondary: 1300 µg/m3; 0.5 ppm maximum 3-hour 
concentration not to be exceeded more than once per ¥ear; 
60 µg/m3; 0.02 ppm annual arithmetic mean; 260 µg/m ; 0.1 
ppm maximum 24-hour concentration not to be exceeded 
more than once per year. 36 Fed. Reg. 8186, 8187 (1971). 
b. April 26, 1988: EPA decides not to revise the existing pri­
mary and secondary standards. 53 Fed. Reg. 14,926 (1988). 
c. April 21, 1993: EPA decides not to revise the existing sec­
ondary standards. 58 Fed. Reg. 21,351 (1993). 
d. November 15, 1994: EPA publishes a second proposal re­
garding revision of primary standards for sulfur oxides. 59 
Fed. Reg. 58,958 (1994). 
e. May 22, 1996: EPA reviews and revises the air quality cri­
teria upon which the existing national ambient air quality 
standards ("NAAQS") for sulfur oxides are based. Based 
on that review, EPA decides that revisions of the NAAQS 
for sulfur oxides are not appropriate at this time, aside from 
several minor technical changes. 61 Fed. Reg. 25,566 
(1996). 
4. Nitrogen Oxides: 
a. April 30, 1971: EPA issues identical primary and secondary 
standards for N02 set at 0.05 ppm (100 µg/m3) annual 
arithmetic average. 36 Fed. Reg. 8186, 8187 (1971). 
b. December 12, 1978: EPA announces the first review and 
update. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,1117 (1978). 
c. June 19, 1985: EPA decides to retain the same standard. 
50 Fed. Reg. 25,532 (1985). 
d. April 26, 1988: EPA publishes a second proposal regarding 
revision of primary standards. 53 Fed. Reg. 14,926 (1988). 
e. October 11, 1995: EPA proposes to retain national stan­
dards for nitrogen dioxide. 60 Fed. Reg. 52, 874, 52,875 
(1995). 
f. October 8, 1996: EPA issues its final decision retaining 
standard for nitrogen dioxide. 61 Fed. Reg. 52,852 (1996). 
5. Carbon Monoxide: 
a. April 30, 1971: EPA promulgates the initial standard for 
carbon monoxide at the level of 10 µg/m3, 9 ppm maximum 
8-hour concentration not to be exceeded more than once 
per year; 40 µg/m3, 35 ppm maximum 1-hour concentration 
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not to be exceeded more than once per year. 36 Fed. Reg. 
8186, 8187 (1971). 
b. September 13, 1985: EPA retains the primary standard and 
revokes the secondary standard. 50 Fed. Reg. 37,484 
(1985). 
c. August 1, 1994: EPA announces its decision to retain the 
current primary standard for carbon monoxide. There is no 
secondary standard for carbon monoxide. 59 Fed. Reg. 
38,906, 38909-11 (1994). 
6. Lead: 
a. October 5, 1978: EPA promulgates standards for lead at 
the level of 1.5 µg Pb/m3• 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246 (1978). 
b. November 5, 1997: EPA publishes final rule for lead, 62 
Fed. Reg. 59,813, 59,813-14 (1997), but withdraws it on Dec. 
23, 1997, due to adverse comments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 67,009. 
c. January 20, 1999: EPA issues final rule. 64 Fed. Reg. 3030, 
3030-31 (1999). 
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(Note: The following tables are taken verbatim from the EPA's 
Regulatory Impact Analysis, as noted in the text.) 
TABLE 2: PROPOSED P11i0 STANDARD (50/150 µG/M3 ) 99TH 
PERCENTILE NATIONALANNuALHEALTH 
INCIDENCE REDUCTIONS323 
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS 
(year = 2010) 
Partial Attainment Scenario 
Annual P� (µg/m) 50 
ENDPOJNT324 Daily P� (µg/m) 150 
*L Mortality325: short-term exposure 360 
long-term e:xposure 340 
*2. Chronic Bronchitis 6,800 
Hospital Admissions: 
*3. all respiratory (all ages) 190 
all resp. (ages 65+) 470 
pneumonia (ages 65+) 170 
COPD (ages 65+) 140 
*4. Congestive heart failure 130 
*5. Ischemic heart disease 140 
*6. Acute Bronchitis 1,100 
*7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms 10,400 
*8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms 5,300 
shortness of breath 18,300 
asthma attacks 8,800 
*9. Work Loss Days 106,000 
*10. Minor Restricted Activity Days ("MRADs") 879,000 
323. RIA, supra note 70, at 12-45, tbl.12.6. Numbers may not completely agree due to 
rounding. 
324. Only endpoints denoted with an * are aggregated into total benefits estimates. 
325. Mortality estimates must be aggregated using either short-term exposure or long­
term exposure but not both, due to double-counting issues. 
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TABLE 3: OZONE : NATIONAL ANNUAL HEALTH 
INCIDENCE R.EDUCTIONS326 
385 
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone NAAQS (year = 2010) 
Partial Attainment Scenario 
0.08 5th 0.08 4th Max 0.08 3rd Max Max 
ENDPOINT327 
High-end Low- to High· High-end 
Est. end Est. Est. 
Ozone Health: 
*1. Mortality 80 0 - 80 120 
Hospital Admissions 
*2. all respiratory (all ages) 280 300 - 300 420 
all respiratory (ages 65+) 2,300 2,330 - 2,330 1,570 
pneumonia (ages 65+) 860 870 - 870 600 
COPD (ages 65+) 260 260 - 260 200 
emer. Dept. visits for asthma 120 130 - 130 180 
*3. Acute Respiratory Symptoms 28,510 29,840 - 29,840 42,070 
(any of 19) 
asthma attacks 60 60 - 60 90 
MRADs 620 650 - 650 920 
*4. Mortality from air toxics 1 1 - 1  2 
Ancillary PM Health: 
*1. Mortality328: short-term exposure 60 0 - 80 110 
Ion�·term exposure 180 0 - 250 340 
*2. Chronic Bronchitis 400 0 - 530 690 
Hospital Admissions: 
*3. all respiratory (all ages) 70 0 - 90 120 
all resp. (ages 65+) 50 0 - 60 80 
pneumonia (ages 65+) 20 0 - 20 30 
COPD (ages 65+) 10 0 - 20 20 
*4. congestive heart failure 10 0 - 20 20 
*5. ischemic heart disease 10 0 - 20 20 
*6. Acute Bronchitis 290 0 - 400 530 
326. RIA, supra note 70, at 12-47, tbl.12.8. Numbers may not completely agree due to 
rounding. 
327. Only endpoints denoted with an *  are aggregated into total benefits estimates. 
328. PM mortality estimates must be aggregated using either short-term exposure or 
long-term exposure but not both, due to double-counting issues. 
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Partial Attainment Scenario 
0.08 5th 0.08 4th Max 0.08 3rd Max Max 
ENDPOINT327 
High-end Low- to High- High-end 
Est. end Est. Est. 
*7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms 3,510 0 - 4,670 6,190 
*8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms 320 0 - 430 570 
shortness of breath 800 0 - 1,220 1,660 
asthma attacks 4,210 0 - 5,510 7,200 
*9. Work Loss Days 38,700 0 - 50,440 66,160 
*10. Minor Restricted Activity Days 
("MRADs") 322,460 0 - 420,300 551,300 
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TABLE 4: WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY ESTIMATES (MEAN Y ALUES)329 
Health Endpoint 
Mean WTP Value per Incident 
(1990 $) 
Mortality 
Life saved $4.8 million 
Life year extended $120,000 
Hospital Admissions: 
All Respiratory Illnesses, all ages $12,700 
Pneumonia, age ;:: 65 $13,400 
COPD, age ;:: 65 $15,900 
Iscbemic Heart Disease, age ;:: 65 $ 20,600 
Congestive Heart Failure, age ;:: 65 $ 16,600 
Emergency Visits for Asthma $9,000 
Chronic Bronchitis $260,000 
Upper Respiratory Symptoms $19 
Lower Respiratory Symptoms $12 
Acute Bronchitis $45 
Acute Respiratory Symptoms (any of 19) $18 
Asthma $32 
Shortness of Breath $5.30 
Sinusitis and Hay Fever not monetized 
Work Loss Days $83 
Restricted Activity Days ("RAD") 
Minor RAD $38 
Respiratory RAD not monetized 
Worker Productivity $1 per worker per 10% change in ozone 
Visibility: residential $14 per unit decrease in deciview per 
household 
recreational Range of $7.30 to $11 per unit decrease 
in deciview per household 
(see U.S. EPA, 1997a) 
Household Soiling Damage $2.50 per household per µg/m3 
*See the Benefits TSD for citations (U.S. EPA, 1997a). 
329. RIA, supra note 70, at 12-41, tbl.123. 
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TABLE 5: PROPOSED PMi0 STANDARD (50/150 µG/M3 ) 99TH 
PERCENTILE NATIONAL ANNUAL MONETIZED HEALTH BENEFITS 
INCIDENCE REDUCTIONS330 
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone (0.12 ppm, 1-hr.) 
(billions of 1990 $; year = 2010) 
Partial Attainment Scenario 
High-end Est. 
Annual P� (µglm3) 50 
ENDPOINT331 Daily P� (µglm3) 150 
*L Mortality332: short-term exposure $1.7 
Ion2-term exposure $1.6 
*2. Chronic Bronchitis $1.8 
Hospital Admissions: 
*3. all respiratory (all ages) $0.002 
all resp. (ages 65+) $0.006 
pneumonia (ages 65+) $0.003 
COPD (ages 65+) $0.002 
*4. congestive heart failure $0.002 
*5. ischemic heart disease $0.003 
*6. Acute Bronchitis $0 
*7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms $0 
*8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms $0 
shortness of breath $0 
asthma attacks $0 
*9. Work Loss Days $0.009 
*10. Minor Restricted Activity Days ("MRADs") $0.034 
TOTAL MONETIZED BENEFITS 
using long-term mortality $3.4 
using short-term mortality $3.5 
330. RIA, supra note 70, at 12-46, tbl.12.7. Numbers may not completely agree due to 
rounding. 
331. Only endpoints denoted with an * are aggregated into total benefits estimates. 
332. Mortality estimates must be aggregated using either short-term exposure or long­
term exposure but not both, due to double-counting issues. 
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TABLE 6: OZONE : NATIONALANNuAL MONETIZED HEALTH 
BENEFITS ESTIMATES333 
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone NAAQS 
(0.12 ppm, 1-hour) 
(billions of 1990 $; year = 2010) 
Partial Attainment Scenario 
0.08 5th 0.08 4th Max 0.08 3rd Max Max 
ENDPOINT334 ffigh·end 
Low- to ffigh· ffigh-end end Est. Est. . Est. 
Ozone Health: 
*L Mortality $0.370 $0.000 - $0.380 $0.570 
Hospital Admissions 
*2. all respiratory (all ages) $0.004 $0.004 - $0.004 $0.006 
all resp. (ages 65+) $0.029 $0.029 - $0.029 $0 
pneumonia (ages 65+) $0.014 $0.014 - $0.014 $0.010 
COPD (ages 65+) $0.004 $0.004 - $0.004 $0.003 
emer. dept. visits for asthma $0.001 $0.001 - $0.001 $0.002 
t.•3. Acute Respiratory Symptoms $0.001 $0.001 - $0.001 $0.001 
(any of 19) 
asthma attacks $0 $0 - $0 $0 
MRADs $0 $0 - $0 $0 
*4. Mortality from air toxics $0.003 $0.006- $0.006 $0.011 
Ancillary PM Health: 
*L Mortality335: short-term exposure $0.300 $0 - $0.400 $0.520 
long-term exposure $0.870 $0 - $1.210 $1.640 
�·2. Chronic Bronchitis $0.110 $0 - $0.140 $0.180 
Hospital Admissions: 
*3. all respiratory (all ages) $0.001 $0 - $0.001 $0.001 
all resp. (ages 65+) $0.001 $0 - $0.001 $0.001 
pneumonia (ages 65+) $0 $0 - $0 $0 
COPD (ages 65+) $0 $0 - $0 $0 
*4. congestive heart failure $0 $0 - $0 $0 
*5. ischemic heart disease $0 $0 - $0 $0 
*6. Acute Bronchitis $0 $0 - $0 $0 
*7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms $0 $0 - $0 $0 
333. RIA, supra note 70, at 12-48, tbl.12.9. Numbers may not completely agree due to 
rounding. 
334. Only endpoints denoted with an * are aggregated into total benefits estimates. 
335. PM mortality estimates must be aggregated using either short-term exposure or 
long-term exposure but not both, due to double-counting issues. 
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Partial Attainment Scenario 
0.08 5th 0.08 4th Max 0.08 3rd Max Max 
ENDPOINr334 High-end Est. 
Low- to High-
end Est. High-end Est. 
*8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms $0 $0 - $0 $0 
shortness of breath $0 $0 - $0 $0 
asthma attacks $0 $0 - $0 $0 
*9. Work Loss Days $0.003 $0 - $0.004 $0.005 
*10. Minor Restricted Activity Days 
("MRADs") $0.012 $0 - $0.016 $0.020 
TOTAL MONETIZED BENEFITS 
using short-term PM mortality $0.790 $0.056 $1.300 
using long-term PM mortality $1.400 $1.785 $2.400 
TABLE ?: PM: SUMMARY OFNATIONAL .ANNuALMONETIZED 
HEALTH AND WELFARE BENEFITS336 
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS 
(billions of 1990 $; year = 2010) 
Partial Attainment Scenario 
High-end Low- to High-end High-end Est. Est. Est. 
Category Annual PM..s (pglm) 16 15 15 
Daily PM..s (pglm) 65 65 50 
Health Benefits $83 $15 to $96 $99 
Welfare Benefits $7.5 $4.3 to $8.1 $9 
TOTAL MONETIZED BENEFITS $90 $19 to $104 $107 
336. RIA, supra note 70, at 12-69, tbl.12.17. Numbers may not completely agree due to 
rounding. 
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TABLE 8: PM: SELECTED PM10 STANDARD (50/150 µG/M3 - 99TH 
PERCENTILE) SUMMARY OF NATIONAL ANNUAL MONETIZED 
HEALTH AND WELFARE BENEFITS337 
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS 
(billions of 1990 $; year = 2010) 
Partial Attainment Scenario 
High-end Est. 
Category Annual P�0 (µg/m3) 50 
Daily P� (µg/m) 150 
Health Benefits $3.4 to $3.5 
Welfare Benefits $1.6 
TOTAL MONETIZED BENEFITS $5.1 to $5.2 
TABLE 9: OZONE: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL ANNUAL MONETIZED 
HEALTH AND WELFARE BENEFITS338 
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS 
(billions of 1990 $; year = 2010) 
Partial Attainment Scenario 
0.08 5th 0.08 4th max 0.08 3rd max 
Category 
max High- Low- to High- High-end 
end Est. end Est. Est. 
Health Benefits $1.4 $0.06 to $1.76 $2.4 
Welfare Benefits $0.25 $0.32 to $0.32 $0.5 
TOTAL MONETIZED BENEFITS $1.6 . $0.4 to $2.1 $2.9 
337. RIA, supra note 70, at 12-69, tbl.12.18. Numbers may not completely agree due to 
rounding. 
338. RIA, supra note 70, at 12-70, tbl.12.19. Numbers may not completely agree due to 
rounding. 
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TABLE 10: PROPOSED PM10 STANDARD (50/150 µG/M3 ) 99TH 
PERCENTILE NATIONAL ANNuAL HEALTH 
INCIDENCE REDUCTIONS339 
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS: 
(year = 2010) 
Partial Attainment Scenario 
Annual P� (µglm) 50 
ENDPOINI.'34° Daily P� (µglm) 150 
*L Mortality341: short-term exposure 360 
lon�-term exuosure 340 
*2. Chronic Bronchitis 6,800 
Hospital Admissions: 
*3. all respiratory (all ages) 190 
all resp. (ages 65+) 470 
pneumonia (ages 65+) 170 
COPD (ages 65+) 140 
*4. congestive heart failure 130 
*5. ischemic heart disease 140 
*6. Acute Bronchitis 1,100 
*7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms 10,400 
*8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms 5,300 
shortness of breath 18,300 
asthma attacks 8,800 
*9. Work Loss Days 106,000 
*10. Minor Restricted Activity Days ("MRADs") 879,000 
339. RIA, supra note 70, at 12-45, tbl.12.6. Numbers may not completely agree due to 
rounding. 
340. Only endpoints denoted with an * are aggregated into total benefits estinlates. 
341. Mortality estinlates must be aggregated using either short-term exposure or long­
term exposure but not both, due to double-counting issues. 
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TABLE 11: COMPARISON OF ANNuAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PM 
ALTERNATIVES IN 2010 (1990 $)342 
Annual Bene· Annual Costs Net Benefits 
PM:.s fits of Partial of of Number of Re-
Alternative Attainment343 Partial At· Partial At· sidual Nonat· 
(µg/m) (billion $) 
tainment tainment tainment 
(billion $) (billion $) Counties (A) (B) (A - B) 
16/65 
90 5.5 85 19 (high-end estimate) 
15/65 
(low-end estimate) 19 - 104 8.6 10 - 95 30 
(high-end estimate) 
15/50 
108 (high-end estimate) 9.4 98 41 
342. RIA, supra note 70, at 13-3, tbl.13.1. All estimates are measured incremental to 
partial attainment of the current PM,0 standard (PM,0 50/150, 1 expected exceedance per 
year). The results for 16/65 and 15/50 are only for the high-end assumptions ranges. The 
low-end estimates were not calculated for these alternatives. 
343. Partial attainment benefits based upon post-control air quality as defined in the 
control cost analysis. 
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TABLE 12: COMPARISON OF A.NNuAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF 
OZONE ALTERNATIVES IN 2010 (1990 $)344 
Annual Bene- Annual Costs Net Benefits 
Ozone fits of Partial of of Number of Re-
Alternative Attainmenf45 Partial At- Partial At- sidual Nonat-
(ppm) (billion $) tainment tainment tainmcnt Areas (billion $) (billion $) (A) (B) (A - B) 
0.08 5th Max 
1.6 0.9 0.7 12 
(high-end estimate) 
0.08 4th Max 
(low-end estimate) 0.4 - 2.1 1.1 0.7 - 1.0 17 
(high-end estimate) 
0.08 3rd Max 
2.9 1.4 1.5 27 
(high-end estimate) 
344. RIA, supra note 70, at 13-4, tbl.13.2 All estimates are measured incremental to 
partial attainment of the current ozone standard (0.12 ppm, 1 expected exceedance per 
year). The results for 0.08, 5th max., and 0.08, 3rd max., are only for the high-end assump­
tions. The low-end estimates were not calculated for these alternatives. 
345. Partial attainment benefits based upon post-control air quality as defined in the 
control cost analysis. 
